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TWENTY YEARS AFTER BARTNICKI V. VOPPER
Erik Ugland* & Christina Mazzeo**
Abstract: This Article addresses a fluid and increasingly salient category of cases involving
the First Amendment right to publish information that was hacked, stolen, or illegally leaked
by someone else. Twenty years ago, in Bartnicki v. Vopper, the Supreme Court appeared to
give broad constitutional cover to journalists and other publishers in these situations, but
Justice Stevens’s inexact opinion for the Court and Justice Breyer’s muddling concurrence left
the boundaries unclear. The Bartnicki framework is now implicated in dozens of new cases—
from the extradition and prosecution of Julian Assange, to Donald Trump’s threatened suit of
The New York Times over his tax records, to the civil suits spawned by the hack of DNC
servers—so there is a pressing need for clarity.
The empirical part of this Article presents the results of a comprehensive analysis of every
case applying Bartnicki over the past two decades to determine if lower courts have answered
the questions Bartnicki left open and to identify points of confluence and conflict. The analysis
shows courts are divided about nearly every aspect of Bartnicki. There is a circuit split
regarding the amount of separation a publisher must have from a source in order to be
protected, division about the relevance of statutory prohibitions on receiving or possessing
certain information, and confusion about how to assess whether publications, particularly those
involving large caches of data, address matters of public concern.
The normative part of this Article proposes a reorientation of courts’ approaches to these
issues by (1) untethering liability for the procurement, receipt, and publication of information,
treating each as a legally discrete act; (2) denying Bartnicki protection only to those who
directly participate or assist in the illegal procurement of information; (3) treating as a First
Amendment violation any law punishing those who merely receive or possess newsworthy
information; and (4) engaging in more contextual analyses of “public concern.” All of these
changes will help stabilize the law, strike a better balance between newsgathering and secrecy,
and vitalize press and citizen communication at a time of decreasing government and
private-sector transparency.
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INTRODUCTION
The First Amendment is still not ready for Julian Assange. Eleven years
after publishing a trove of classified diplomatic cables obtained through
an illegal leak,1 the WikiLeaks founder,2 hacker,3 self-described

1. In 2010, Assange obtained and published on WikiLeaks thousands of classified diplomatic
cables and war logs that were leaked to him by U.S. Army Intelligence Analyst Chelsea (then Bradley)
Manning. Those materials contradicted official military accounts of U.S. operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan. The most notable was the so-called “Collateral Murder” video showing a 2007 U.S.
airstrike in Iraq that killed at least a dozen civilians, including two Reuters journalists. See Elisabeth
Bumiller, Video Shows U.S. Killing of Reuters Employees, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2010),
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/06/world/middleeast/06baghdad.html [https://perma.cc/MBZ8PNZQ]; Collateral Murder, WIKILEAKS (Apr. 5, 2010), https://collateralmurder.wikileaks.org/
[https://perma.cc/H7WM-KNDS].
2. Assange, an Australian citizen, is the principal founder of WikiLeaks, which was launched in
2006 to provide a vehicle for disseminating information from leakers and whistleblowers while also
producing original reporting. Raffi Khatchadourian, No Secrets, NEW YORKER (May 31, 2010),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2010/06/07/no-secrets [https://perma.cc/GJS6-HAU6].
Assange served as its editor-in-chief from 2006 until September 26, 2018, when WikiLeaks
announced that Kristinn Hrafnsson would take over as editor, but that Assange would remain as
publisher.
WikiLeaks
(@wikileaks),
TWITTER
(Sept.
26,
2018,
12:35
PM),
https://twitter.com/wikileaks/status/1045034219939016704?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5E
tweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1045034219939016704%7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=htt
ps%3A%2F%2Fmashable.com%2Farticle%2Fjulian-assange-no-longer-editor-wikileaks%2F (last
visited Jan. 17, 2021).
3. Assange was an active hacker for much of his youth and into adulthood. When he was twenty,
he pleaded guilty to twenty-five counts of computer fraud but was ultimately given a light sentence.
Khatchadourian, supra note 2.
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journalist,4 and ruthless transparency advocate5 remains in a British jail
awaiting possible extradition to the United States to face an
eighteen-charge indictment over his alleged role in soliciting, receiving
and publishing secret information affecting national defense.6 Even if
Assange is extradited,7 the outcome of his trial would be impossible to
predict, because much of the relevant law remains inchoate. Nearly ninety
years after the United States Supreme Court first struck down a
government action limiting press freedom,8 U.S. courts have not fully
answered some foundational questions about the boundaries of the First
Amendment’s Press Clause9 and the institutions, individuals, and
activities to which it should be applied. They are also years behind in
grappling with emergent technology and the atomized ways in which
news and information are now gathered and shared.
An Assange prosecution could serve as a crucible for all of this, but
that case is not singularly important; it is one of dozens that pose the same
4. Scott Shane & Steven Erlanger, Assange: A Self-Proclaimed Foe of Secrecy Who Inspires Both
Admiration and Fury, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 11, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/11/us/politic
s/wikileaks-assange.html [https://perma.cc/M3D2-R5K7] (“[Assange] has always described himself
as a journalist . . . .”).
5. See, e.g., Raffi Khatchadourian, Julian Assange, A Man Without a Country, NEW YORKER (Aug.
14, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/08/21/julian-assange-a-man-without-acountry [https://perma.cc/33RF-TW7P] (“‘If it’s true information, we don’t care where it comes
from,’ [Assange] said. ‘Let people fight with the truth, and when the bodies are cleared there will be
bullets of truth everywhere.’”).
6. Superseding Indictment at 1, United States v. Assange, No. 1:18-cr-111 (E.D. Va. May 23, 2019)
[hereinafter Assange Superseding Indictment]. A second superseding indictment was issued in June
2020. Second Superseding Indictment, United States v. Assange, No. 1:18-cr-111 (E.D. Va. June 24,
2020) [hereinafter Assange Second Superseding Indictment]. It adds additional information and
broadens the scope of the inquiry but does not add any additional charges. Id. References in this
Article to the “Assange indictment” refer to the first superseding indictment unless otherwise
specified. Assange is in jail for violating his bail conditions following his arrest for allegedly sexually
assaulting two women in Sweden. Julian Assange: A Timeline of Wikileaks Founder’s Case, BBC
(Nov. 19, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-11949341 [https://perma.cc/6VJU6UDK]. Those charges have been dropped but he remains in jail while a British court considers the
U.S. Justice Department’s request to extradite Assange to the United States. Id.
7. On Jan. 4, 2021, a British judge ruled that Assange could not be extradited because of his
unstable mental state and the likeilhood that he would be held in isolation in a United States prison.
Ben Quinn, Julian Assange Cannot Be Extradited to US, British Judge Rules, THE GUARDIAN (Jan.
4, 2021), https://www.theguardian.com/media/2021/jan/04/julian-assange-cannot-be-extradited-tous-british-judge-rules [https://perma.cc/53DJ-QZJJ]. United States prosecutors are appealing that
ruling. Id. Importantly, in her ruling, Judge Vanessa Baraitser did not reject the merits of the United
States indictment, conceding that Assange could be prosecuted without violating his rights if United
States prosecutors proved their case at trial. Id.
8. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 701 (1931) (striking down, under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments, a state law allowing judges to enjoin “malicious, scandalous and defamatory”
publications).
9. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom . . . of the
press . . . .”).
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vital question: Can people be held civilly or criminally liable for
publishing information that was illegally acquired by someone else? The
United States Supreme Court has already addressed this question in two
of its most important First Amendment cases, New York Times Co. v.
United States (Pentagon Papers)10 and Bartnicki v. Vopper.11 But neither
of those cases, nor the two together, provides a complete answer. Because
Pentagon Papers involved an injunction halting publication, which is
exceedingly rare, it is distinguishable from Assange’s case and most
others like it. Bartnicki is more on point. It addressed the broadcast of an
illegally intercepted and recorded phone conversation between people
involved in a labor dispute between a school district and teacher’s union.
The Court upheld the right of a radio host who obtained the recording to
broadcast it, and concluded that people may disseminate illegally acquired
information provided (1) they played no part in the illegal interception;
(2) they lawfully acquired the information; and (3) the information relates
to a matter of public concern.12
The Bartnicki ruling was a leap forward but it left unanswered
questions: When do journalists become so closely involved with their
sources that they forfeit Bartnicki protection? In what circumstances do
journalists obtain information unlawfully? What constitutes a matter of
“public concern”? Finally, who is a journalist, or more precisely, what
types of defendants are eligible for First Amendment protections in these
situations? Despite these uncertainties, journalists and commentators
often overstate the clarity and scope of Bartnicki when discussing it in the
context of new hacking and leaking cases, presenting it as essentially a
grant of absolute immunity for journalists and publishers who use illegally
acquired information.13 Those accounts typically overlook the “public
concern” prong of the Court’s test, which limits Bartnicki’s relevance in
cases like Bollea v. Gawker14 involving the publication of a celebrity sex
tape.15 They also tend to focus on Justice Stevens’s opinion of the Court
10. 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
11. 532 U.S. 514 (2001).
12. Id. at 525. The Court did not explicitly present this as a test, but these were the conditions it
highlighted as justification for its ruling for the defendants. Id.
13. See discussion infra section II.C.
14. 170 So. 3d 125 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015).
15. Id.; see also Bollea v. Gawker Media, LLC, No. 12012447 CI-01, 2016 Fla. Cir. LEXIS 4710
(Fla. Cir. Ct. June 8, 2016). Terry Bollea, a professional wrestler known by the name Hulk Hogan,
sued Gawker media for invasion of privacy after Gawker published a link to an explicit video of
Bollea engaged in a sexual encounter. Bollea, 170 So. 3d at 127. The video was recorded without
Bollea’s knowledge or consent. Id. After rejecting Gawker’s claim that the video was newsworthy
because Bollea is both a celebrity and someone who has publicly discussed his past sexual
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in Bartnicki without recognizing the ways in which it was both narrowed
and obfuscated by the concurring opinion of Justice Breyer.16 These
inexact media reports mask the fact that Bartnicki is not the robust,
anchoring precedent that people assume but a cautious, narrow and
ambiguous first step, and a precedent whose persuasiveness and durability
are even more uncertain in light of new technologies and changes in the
makeup of the Court.
Resolving these issues is especially urgent in light of broader social
trends—authoritarian drift,17 declining government transparency,18
withering press freedom19—but also because new cases and controversies
are regularly arising that expose the post-Bartnicki instability:
In a March 2017 tweet that he later deleted, New York Times columnist
Nicholas Kristof urged employees of the IRS to leak President Donald
Trump’s tax returns to him.20 Would Kristof be protected by Bartnicki
against a felony charge of soliciting a crime, or would his actions be
treated as “participation” under prong one of the Bartnicki test?
In January 2019, the National Enquirer began publishing private text
messages sent by Amazon CEO Jeff Bezos to his mistress, Lauren
experiences, the court awarded Bollea $115 million in compensatory damages and $25 million in
punitive damages. Nick Madigan, Jury Tacks on $25 Million to Gawker’s Bill in Hulk Hogan Case,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 21, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/22/business/media/hulk-hogandamages-25-million-gawker-case.html#:~:text=A%20Florida%20jury%20assessed%20
Gawker,in%20compensatory%20damages%20last%20week [https://perma.cc/LE86-6L38]. Gawker
and its founder, Nick Denton, subsequently filed for bankruptcy. Lukas I. Alpert, Gawker Files for
Bankruptcy, Will Be Put Up for Auction, WALL ST. J. (June 10, 2016),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/gawker-declaring-bankruptcy-will-be-put-up-for-auction-1465578030
[https://perma.cc/9QD5-RQM9].
16. See discussion infra section II.B.
17. See generally STEVEN LEVITSKY & DANIEL ZIBLATT, HOW DEMOCRACIES DIE (2018); Gideon
Rose, Autocracy Now, FOREIGN AFFS., Sept.–Oct. 2019, at 8.
18. See generally U.S. Hits New Low in Global Corruption Index, TRANSPARENCY INT’L (Jan. 23,
2020), https://www.transparency.org/en/press/2019-cpi-us-hits-new-low [https://perma.cc/PM77RBM3]
(citing
Corruption
Perceptions
Index,
TRANSPARENCY
INT’L
(2019),
https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2019 [https://perma.cc/9HSF-HZWV]); Micah Lee, The
Metadata Trap, THE INTERCEPT (Aug. 4, 2019, 4:00 AM), https://theintercept.com/2019/08/04/whis
tleblowers-surveillance-fbi-trump/ [https://perma.cc/7HGY-3XZ5] (describing Trump
Administration use of data surveillance to track and prosecute government leakers).
19. See generally Global Expression Report 2018-19: Global Freedom of Expression at a Ten-Year
Low, ARTICLE19 (Dec. 2, 2019), https://www.article19.org/resources/global-expression-report-201819-global-freedom-of-expression-at-a-ten-year-low/ [https://perma.cc/SX7G-ED32].
20. Nicholas Kristof (@NickKristof), TWITTER (Mar. 5, 2017, 5:00 PM),
https://twitter.com/NickKristof/status/838554838329872384?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5
Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E838554838329872384%7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=htt
ps%3A%2F%2Fthehill.com%2Fhomenews%2Fmedia%2F322477-nyt-columnist-urges-irsemployees-to-unlawfully-leak-trumps-tax-returns (last visited Jan. 17, 2021) (“But if you’re in IRS
and have a certain president’s tax return that you’d like to leak, my address is: NYT, 620 Eighth Ave,
NY NY 10018.”).
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Sanchez, which the Enquirer obtained by paying $200,000 to Sanchez’s
brother.21 Is the Enquirer covered by Bartnicki, or did the payment make
this an “unlawful acquisition” under prong two?
In July 2015, ESPN reporter Adam Schefter tweeted a leaked image of
NFL player Jason Pierre-Paul’s private medical record indicating that
Pierre-Paul’s finger had been amputated following a fireworks accident.22
Does Bartnicki shield ESPN and Schefter, or does this material lie outside
of the “public concern” condition of prong three?
Similar cases are emerging in other jurisdictions and in cases involving
citizen-journalists, activists, and ordinary social media users who want to
share newsworthy information that was illegally acquired or leaked by
someone else.23 These cases highlight enduring uncertainties about
journalistic identity and its constitutional significance, something that is
also implicated by the case against Assange, whom prosecutors have
taken pains to present as a hacker and saboteur, not a journalist.24
Another question that has emerged since Bartnicki is whether
publishers lose First Amendment protection if they fail to exercise

21. Michael Rothfeld, Joe Palazzolo & Alexandra Berzon, How the National Enquirer Got Bezos’
Texts: It Paid $200,000 to His Lover’s Brother, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 18, 2019, 8:06 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-the-national-enquirer-got-bezos-texts-it-paid-200-000-to-hislovers-brother-11552953981 [https://perma.cc/KH3N-ENGA].
22. Adam Schefter (@AdamSchefter), TWITTER (July 8, 2015, 4:04 p.m.),
https://twitter.com/AdamSchefter/status/618918579770146816 (last visited Jan. 17, 2021) (“ESPN
obtained medical charts that show Giants DE Jason Pierre-Paul had right index finger
amputated today.”).
23. In July 2019, the Daily Mail in London published leaked diplomatic cables from Britain’s
ambassador to the United States, Kim Darroch, in which Darroch privately lambasted President
Trump. British police warned journalists that publishing the cables “may also be a criminal matter.”
Henry Martin, Terror Cops Probe Leak of Darroch Emails About Trump: Scotland Yard Is Accused
of ‘Police State’ Tactics with Threat to Prosecute Publishers Who Print More Secrets, DAILY MAIL
(July 13, 2019, 4:34 AM), https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-7242257/UK-police-launchinvestigation-leak-ambassador-Sir-Kim-Darrochs-diplomatic-emails.html [https://perma.cc/8QZ5NPLU]. That same month, Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro threatened criminal charges against
Brazil-based Guardian reporter Glenn Greenwald after he published material hacked from a cellphone
conversation between a judge and prosecutors. Brazilians Show Support for American Journalist
Greenwald, AP NEWS (July 30, 2019), https://www.apnews.com/cd8c55f4a9ec49cc83724cda81d32
be7 [https://perma.cc/E5MG-9E8C]. The criminal charges were later dropped by the government is
appealing that ruling. Brazilian Prosecutors Appeal Judge’s Order, Refuse to Drop Criminal Charges
Against Journalist Glenn Greenwald, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FOUND. (Mar. 3, 2020),
https://freedom.press/news/brazilian-prosecutors-appeal-judges-order-refuse-to-drop-criminalcharges-against-journalist-glenn-greenwald/ [https://perma.cc/W2W5-7WMA].
24. See Press Release, Dept. of Just., Remarks from the Briefing Announcing the Superseding
Indictment of Julian Assange (May 23, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pressrelease/file/1165636/download [https://perma.cc/2MYD-KP9H] (“Julian Assange is no journalist.
This made plain by the totality of his conduct as alleged in the indictment—i.e., his conspiring with
and assisting a security clearance holder to acquire classified information, and his publishing the
names of human sources.”).
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editorial scrutiny over the information they disclose. Do “data dumpers”
who indiscriminately post leaked files online qualify for protection? The
dissenters in Bartnicki anticipated this problem and argued that the
majority’s approach would allow people to “anonymously launder”
illegally acquired records by simply handing them off to third parties.25
This is essentially what happened in 2016 when WikiLeaks published
thousands of private emails that were hacked from Democratic National
Committee (DNC) staff members and from Hillary Clinton’s campaign
chair, John Podesta, apparently by Russian operatives. The DNC hack has
already spawned two civil cases, yielding diametric rulings from two
federal district courts.26 These cases also highlight the editorial scrutiny
question because WikiLeaks likely did not review each of the more than
70,000 email messages and attachments that it published.27
This Article provides a comprehensive review of all lower court cases
applying Bartnicki to understand how the case has been interpreted over
the past twenty years and how lower courts have answered the questions
left open by the Supreme Court in 2001. The Article also critically
evaluates the courts’ analyses and offers normative suggestions for
unifying this area of law, both through a reversal and reimagining of
Bartnicki and, alternatively, through a set of interpretive adjustments to
each prong of the Bartnicki test.
Part I traces the evolution of the right to gather news and describes the
Supreme Court’s mixed guidance on these issues, both with regard to the
general right to seek information and with regard to the scope of
protections in situations like Bartnicki where newsgathering and
expression are closely intertwined.
Part II summarizes the review of cases applying Bartnicki, showing
significant divisions among the courts over the meaning and scope of each
prong of the Bartnicki test, including splits between several circuit courts.
25. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 551 (2001) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
26. In one case, Democratic National Committee (DNC) donors and staffers sued the Trump
Campaign for allegedly collaborating with Russian hackers who accessed the plaintiffs’ private email
communications, which were later published by WikiLeaks. That claim was dismissed by a federal
district court in March 2019 after the court found no evidence of collaboration between the defendants
and the suspected hackers. Cockrum v. Donald J. Trump for President, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 3d 652 (E.D.
Va. 2019). In the second case, decided July 30, 2019, a federal district court dismissed a DNC lawsuit
against Assange and WikiLeaks (among other defendants) for its role in publishing the hacked emails
because the defendants did not actually participate in the hack. Democratic Nat’l Comm. (DNC) v.
Russian Fed’n, 392 F. Supp. 3d 410 (S.D.N.Y. 2019).
27. WikiLeaks published 20,000 DNC emails just four days after receiving them from the Russian
hackers. 1 SPECIAL COUNSEL ROBERT S. MUELLER, III, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., REPORT ON THE
INVESTIGATION INTO RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE IN THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 46 (2019),
https://www.justice.gov/storage/report.pdf [https://perma.cc/JUQ3-276H]. The organization later
published, over the course of a month, 50,000 of Podesta’s e-mails and related documents. Id. at 48.
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With regard to prong one, courts disagree about the amount of
involvement a publisher must have with a source before becoming a
“participant” in an illegal acquisition of information. Some courts have
drawn support from Justice Stevens’s concurring opinion to deny
Bartnicki protection to those who knew the information they received was
illegally acquired and to those who encouraged illegal leaks. On prong
two, at least one circuit court has held that reporters lose Bartnicki
protection when requesting certain non-public records—even when those
records are newsworthy and are supplied by the government—creating an
extraordinary loophole to the Bartnicki framework. As for prong three,
courts continue to disagree about both the definition of “public concern”
and about whether to assess it—particularly in hacking and data-dump
cases—by examining individual revelations or the impact of the totality
of the disclosures.
Part III outlines proposals for reorienting the law by, at the broadest
level, completely severing the connection between the right to publish
information and the legality of its procurement. More specifically, it
suggests applying a modified aiding and abetting standard under prong
one, denying Bartnicki protection only to those who are actively involved
in the illegal procurement of information. With regard to prong two, it
proposes the elimination of any liability for those who merely receive or
possess illegally acquired but newsworthy information. It also endorses a
contextually driven concept of public concern that considers the
newsworthiness of the totality of what is published for determining the
applicability of Bartnicki while still holding publishers accountable for
harms caused by the content of what they publish.
I.

THE RIGHT TO GATHER NEWS

This Article focuses on a small but increasingly vital category of First
Amendment cases involving the intersection of free expression rights and
rights to gather news and information. In these cases, the government or
a civil litigant seeks to suppress or subsequently punish the dissemination
of information, at least in part because of some alleged problem with the
means by which it was acquired. The Supreme Court did not begin to
address this confluence of newsgathering and expression until the 1970s.
In fact, the Court did not even begin to develop its free press jurisprudence
until 1931 in Near v. Minnesota28—the first case in which the Court struck
down a government restriction on speech in a traditional mass medium.29
28. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
29. Id. at 722–23. The Court had decided a handful of free speech cases prior to Near, but all of
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Throughout the next several decades, most of the Court’s First
Amendment decisions involved obscenity, defamation, or other cases
focused on harms associated with the speech itself. In many of these cases,
the Court made reference to the press or to media defendants but never
clarified whether the Speech Clause30 and Press Clause31 should be treated
as discrete sources of protection or as a collective statement about free
expression, and it never explained whether and to what extent the First
Amendment protects pre-publication activities. Four decades after Near,
the Court started to confront these questions, but despite tectonic shifts in
communications practices over the past twenty years, the rise of
citizen-journalists and the proliferation of new surveillance tools and
distributions platforms, the Court has not offered any significant insights
on these issues since Bartnicki in 2001.
A.

The Supreme Court’s Conceptualization of the Right to
Gather News

The Supreme Court has only addressed the right to gather news32 in a
handful of cases. The first was Branzburg v. Hayes,33 in which the Court
acknowledged that newsgathering “is not without its First Amendment
protections”34 and that “without some protection for seeking out the news,
freedom of the press could be eviscerated.”35 Despite those affirmations,
Branzburg was a step backward in that the Court refused to recognize a
First Amendment-based reporter’s privilege—the right of journalists to
quash subpoenas seeking their work products or testimony, particularly
where confidential sources might be exposed. The Court in Branzburg
was deeply divided, however, and because the fifth vote was supplied by

them involved speakers and pamphleteers. See, e.g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919)
(involving the distribution of leaflets opposing the military draft); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S.
616 (1919) (involving the distribution of leaflets opposing the United States’ involvement in World
War I); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (involving the distribution of a printed manifesto
urging worker strikes and revolts to help institute a socialist government).
30. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech . . . .”).
31. Id. (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom . . . of the press . . . .”).
32. It is important to distinguish the right to gather information from the right to receive
information. The Court has recognized the latter right in several cases, but none of these involved the
pursuit of new information; they involved government attempts to interrupt the flow of information
from one party to another. See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (upholding right of
citizen to receive and possess obscene material in his home); Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S.
301 (1965) (striking down law blocking mail distribution of communist literature).
33. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
34. Id. at 707.
35. Id. at 681.
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Justice Powell, who urged a case-by-case approach,36 the decision left the
door open for lower courts to recognize some protections in contexts
dissimilar from those in Branzburg.37 This is precisely what happened in
the subsequent decades. Most of the federal circuit courts now recognize
some form of the reporter’s privilege,38 and forty state legislatures have
passed shield laws providing reporters with statutory protections against
certain subpoenas,39 although Congress has still not passed a federal
shield law.
In the years following Branzburg, the Supreme Court continued to
emphasize the absence of constitutional protections for newsgathering. In
a series of cases in the 1970s, the Court rejected journalists’ claims of a
First Amendment right of access to prisons and prisoners.40 In 1978, the
Court refused to recognize a First Amendment shield against newsroom
searches,41 and the following year it held that journalists and news
organizations are not immune from inquiries into their editorial
decision-making processes by libel litigants.42 More than a decade later,
the Court reiterated in Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.43 that journalists and
the press have no First Amendment defense against the application of
generally applicable laws.44 The Court ruled in Cohen that journalists
could be sued for breaking their promises of confidentiality with
sources.45 The Court has also repeatedly rejected attempts by journalists
to gain access to places where the public generally is not permitted.46
36. Id. at 710 (Powell, J., concurring).
37. Branzburg and the associated cases decided concurrently—In re Pappas, 408 U.S. 665 (1972)
and United States v. Caldwell, 408 U.S. 665 (1972)—involved grand jury subpoenas seeking
confidential source information.
38. See Reporter’s Privilege Compendium, REPS. COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS,
https://www.rcfp.org/reporters-privilege/ [https://perma.cc/H7LP-EP5H].
39. Id.
40. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974) (upholding California regulations effectively preventing
journalists from interviewing prisoners); Saxbe v. Wash. Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974) (upholding
federal regulations denying press access to prisoners); Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978)
(denying right of broadcast journalists to observe and record conditions in county jail).
41. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978) (upholding constitutional validity of police
execution of a search warrant on the premises of a university newspaper). In response to Zurcher, the
U.S. Congress provided a statutory fix by passing a law explicitly prohibiting searches of newsrooms
except under certain conditions. See Privacy Protection Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa.
42. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
43. 501 U.S. 663 (1991).
44. Id. at 669 (“[G]enerally applicable laws do not offend the First Amendment simply because
their enforcement against the press has incidental effects on its ability to gather and report the news.”).
45. Id. at 671–72.
46. See Reporter’s Privilege Compendium, supra note 38. Lower courts have followed suit. See,
e.g., Flynt v. Rumsfeld, 245 F. Supp. 2d 94 (D.D.C. 2003), aff’d on other grounds, 355 F.3d 697
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Although the Court has recognized a First Amendment-based right of
access to attend some judicial proceedings and to access associated
judicial records,47 it has made clear that those rights belong to the “public
and press”48 and are less about enabling news coverage than honoring
traditions and ensuring fair processes. Despite acknowledging in
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia49 that “it is difficult for [citizens]
to accept what they are prohibited from observing,”50 the Court has
explicitly rejected the notion that the First Amendment compels the
government to provide access to government-controlled records51
or places.52
Although the Supreme Court has not directly addressed the right to
capture images, video, or data in public places, several federal courts have
begun to recognize a right to record police officers53 or other government
officials54 while they are on duty. Some courts have framed this as part of
a broader right to photograph and record “matters of public interest”55—
sometimes even on private property56—and have emphasized the

(D.C. Cir. 2004) (rejecting First Amendment right of journalists to accompany troops during military
operations); City of Oak Creek v. King, 436 N.W.2d 285 (Wis. 1989) (finding no First Amendment
problem with disorderly conduct charge against reporter who refused to leave scene of a plane crash).
47. Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 478 U.S. 1 (1986); Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Ct. of
Cal., 464 U.S. 501 (1984); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
48. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 558.
49. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
50. Id. at 572.
51. McBurney v. Young, 569 U.S. 221 (2013).
52. See, e.g., Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834 (1974) (“The Constitution does not . . . require
government to accord the press special access to information not shared by members of the public
generally.”); Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 12 (1978) (“Whether government should open
penal institutions . . . is a question of policy which a legislative body might appropriately
resolve . . . .”). Congress and all fifty state legislatures have substantially filled that void, however,
by passing freedom of information laws that establish at least a presumption of access to most
government records and meetings. See Open Government Guide, REPS. COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE
PRESS, https://www.rcfp.org/open-government-guide/ [https://perma.cc/DY9Y-8T9H].
53. See, e.g., ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583 (7th Cir. 2012) (issuing a preliminary
injunction against enforcement of Illinois eavesdropping law making it a felony to record audio of
police officers); Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2011) (rejecting police officers’ claim of
qualified immunity because their arrest of citizen who recorded them in public was a violation of the
citizen’s clearly established First Amendment rights); Fordyce v. City of Seattle, 55 F.3d 436 (9th
Cir. 1995) (reversing a lower court’s summary judgment dismissal of an assault claim against police
officers who allegedly sought to intimidate citizen who had been recording protesters).
54. Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000) (recognizing “the right to
gather information about what public officials do on public property”).
55. Id.
56. See Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Wasden, 878 F.3d 1184 (9th Cir. 2018) (striking down state
“Ag-Gag” law limiting ability of activists and journalists to document animal abuse on large farms
and ranches).
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indivisibility of newsgathering and news dissemination.57 This domain of
cases is still evolving but shows that lower courts are at least starting to
give shape to the Supreme Court’s vague recognition in Branzburg of a
right to gather news, even though the Court itself has done little
to elaborate.
B.

The Supreme Court’s Treatment of Newsgathering-Expression
Interconnections

The Supreme Court and lower courts have been clearer and more
solicitous in cases where newsgathering is closely linked with expression.
In Pentagon Papers, the fact that the key information was supplied via an
illegal leak was not enough to stop the Court from striking down an order
prohibiting publication.58 And lower courts have held that even though
journalists are not immune from liability for laws they break59 or torts they
commit60 while gathering news, those claims must be disentangled from
claims targeting what they publish or broadcast.61
The Supreme Court’s most thorough statements on the intersection of
newsgathering and dissemination have come in a line of cases involving
attempts to suppress or punish the publication of information that was not
meant to be public. In Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co.,62 the Court
vacated the criminal prosecution of reporters who violated a state law by
publishing the name of a juvenile crime suspect. In doing so, the Court
established a formidable standard: when someone “lawfully obtains
truthful information about a matter of public significance,” the state may
not punish its publication “absent a need to further a state interest of the
highest order.”63 The Court did not elaborate about what might constitute
unlawful acquisition, nor whether this fact is always dispositive.
In the other cases in this line, however, the Court found criminal or
civil penalties to be unconstitutional when targeting the publication of

57. Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 595; see also Wasden, 878 F.3d at 1203 (“[C]laim[ing] that the act of
creating an audiovisual recording is not speech protected by the First Amendment . . . is akin to saying
that even though a book is protected by the First Amendment, the process of writing the book is not.”).
58. See N.Y. Times Co. v. United States (Pentagon Papers), 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
59. See, e.g., United States v. Matthews, 209 F.3d 338 (4th Cir. 2000) (rejecting First Amendment
defense of journalist who downloaded child pornography, ostensibly as research for a story on
the subject).
60. Food Lion, Inc. v. Cap. Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 1999).
61. Id. (affirming judgment against defendant news organization for tort violations—trespass,
breach of the duty of loyalty—committed by employees as part of an undercover investigation but
reversing the awarding of publication-related damages); see infra text accompanying notes 277–280.
62. 443 U.S. 97 (1979).
63. Id. at 103.
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private information that: was disclosed in open court (Cox Broadcasting
Corp. v. Cohn64), was revealed in a proceeding closed to the public but
open to journalists (Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court65), was the
subject of a closed proceeding but was independently discovered by
journalists (Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia66), or was
provided to journalists by mistake (Florida Star v. B.J.F.67).
This was the general state of the law leading up to the Court’s decision
in Bartnicki in 2001. The Court had acknowledged, as a sort of abstract
principle, that the First Amendment implicitly protects a right to gather
news, but the Court had repeatedly rejected the pleas of journalists to
provide specific layers of privileges not enjoyed by the public generally.
Where the Court had been solicitous of press litigants, however, was in
cases in which expressive rights were more tightly intertwined with
newsgathering—a situation presented again by the facts of Bartnicki.
II.

THE MEANING AND INFLUENCE OF BARTNICKI V.
VOPPER

Bartnicki reached the Supreme Court at the dawn of the Digital Age—
a period in which legislatures were still trying to protect internet users
from salacious content68 while at the same time a generation of internet
utopians were declaring cyberspace to be a wholly differentiated sphere
of human existence beyond the reach of traditional law or national
boundaries.69 The Court has always been reluctant to make wide-ranging
pronouncements, especially where dynamic spheres of society are
involved, and indeed the justices in Bartnicki expressed some hesitation
about trying to map legal boundaries during a period of unusual
technological tumult.70 Nevertheless, twenty years later, courts are still
struggling to understand and apply Bartnicki and are now faced with a
range of new speech-privacy conflicts and tech-enabled newsgathering

64. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
65. 430 U.S. 308 (1977).
66. 435 U.S. 829 (1978).
67. 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
68. Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 609; S. 652, 104th Cong. § 501, 110
Stat. 133 (1996) (enacted).
69. See John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, ELEC. FRONTIER
FOUND. (Feb. 8, 1996), https://www.eff.org/cyberspace-independence [https://perma.cc/M2W9NH4W].
70. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 541 (2001) (Breyer, J., concurring) (“[I]n my view, the
Constitution permits legislatures to respond flexibly to the challenges future technology may pose to
the individual’s interest in basic personal privacy. Clandestine and pervasive invasions of
privacy . . . are genuine possibilities as a result of continuously advancing technologies.”).

Ugland & Mazzeo (Do Not Delete)

152

3/22/2021 11:58 AM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 96:139

and surveillance practices, so there is an urgent need to find clarity and
for the Court to reengage with these issues.
A.

The Supreme Court’s Ruling in Bartnicki

The Bartnicki case arose in the unremarkable context of a labor
negotiation between a teacher’s union and a school board. When the head
of the union, Gloria Bartnicki, and its chief negotiator, Anthony Kane,
were on a private cell phone conversation discussing the matter, someone
(whose identity was never discovered) intercepted and recorded their
exchange. The conversation was mostly about strategy but included a
sensational declaration by Kane that if the school board did not agree to a
3% pay raise, “we’re gonna have to go to their, their homes . . . . To blow
off their front porches, we’ll have to do some work on some of those
guys.”71 The recording was given to a local political operative, Jack
Yocum,72 who eventually gave it to Fredrick Vopper—a radio host who,
on multiple occasions, put salient parts of the recording on the air.
Bartnicki and Kane sued Yocum and Vopper for violating federal and
state wiretap laws,73 which prohibit the intentional interception of private
electronic communications. Those laws also criminalize the disclosure of
the contents of illegal interceptions by anyone who knew, or had reason
to know, that the material been illegally intercepted.74
Four decades earlier, in Pentagon Papers, the Court made clear that the
illegal actions of a source in acquiring and disclosing information are not
automatically imputed to a journalist who receives that information.75 But
the justices did not foreclose the possibility that in other contexts a
source’s illegal actions could be relevant in deciding an action against a
journalist. The justices also did not address the extent to which actions by
the journalists themselves could undo their freedom to publish. The Court
revisited these issues in Florida Star, posing but not reaching the
following question: “[W]hether, in cases where information has been
acquired unlawfully . . . government may ever punish not only the

71. Id. at 518–19 (majority opinion).
72. Yocum testified that someone had left a tape recording of the phone call in his mailbox. Id.
at 519.
73. Id. at 520 (first citing 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a); and then citing 18 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 5725(a) (2000)).
74. The Court indicated that both Yocum and Vopper had reason to know the recording was
illegally captured, even if they did not know the identity of the interceptor. Id. at 517–18, 525.
75. As the Court in Bartnicki noted, none of the justices in Pentagon Papers placed any weight on
the fact that the information the defendant intended to publish had been stolen by its source. Id. at 528.
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unlawful acquisition, but the ensuing publication as well.”76 In Bartnicki,
Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, framed the question more narrowly:
“Where the punished publisher of information has obtained the
information in question in a manner lawful in itself but from a source who
has obtained it unlawfully, may the government punish the ensuing
publication of that information based on the defect in a chain?”77
The Court in Bartnicki held that the wiretap statutes’ prohibitions on
capturing and using private communications were content-neutral, but it
construed the “naked prohibition against disclosures . . . as a regulation of
pure speech.”78 Such communications, the Court held, are subject to the
more exacting standard outlined in Daily Mail barring punishment for
publication “absent a need to further a state interest of the highest order.”79
The Court concluded that neither the government’s interest in eliminating
the incentive to intercept private communications80 nor the need to protect
communicators’ privacy was sufficiently weighty to justify the burden on
speech. The Court acknowledged that the privacy of communications is
an especially important interest that is threatened by the possibility of
public disclosure but noted that this must be balanced against the First
Amendment interests implicated by punishing the dissemination of
newsworthy information. The conversation between Kane and Bartnicki,
the Court concluded, “unquestionably”81 involved matters of public
concern82 and therefore “implicate[d] the core purposes of the
First Amendment.”83
The concurring opinion of Justice Breyer, joined by Justice O’Connor,
was principally directed to this last point. Breyer argued that the majority
gave too little weight to the government’s interests in protecting
communicative privacy—an interest that Breyer said is, like speech itself,
one “of the highest order.”84 He framed the wiretap laws as simultaneously

76. Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 535 n.8 (1989) (emphasis omitted). Because the defendant in
Florida Star had lawfully obtained the records at issue, the Court did not have a reason to address this
question directly, so the Court reserved the question for future consideration. Id.
77. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 528 (quoting Boehner v. McDermott (Boehner I), 191 F.3d 463, 484–85
(D.C. Cir. 1999) (Sentelle, J., dissenting)).
78. Id. at 526 (emphasis added).
79. Id. at 103; see also supra text accompanying notes 62–63.
80. The Court was skeptical that punishing disclosures would actually inhibit illegal interceptions
and noted that the plaintiffs had provided no evidence to justify that claim. In any case, the Court
held, the more efficient way to create such a deterrence is to punish more strictly the act of illegal
interception itself. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 530–31.
81. Id. at 535.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 533–34.
84. Id. at 538 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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speech-restricting and speech-enhancing and suggested that a more
careful balancing of interests was therefore required.85 Breyer wrote that
because the majority’s approach undervalued the plaintiffs’ interests in
expressive privacy, it effectively applied a strict scrutiny analysis, which
is “normally out of place where, as here, important competing
constitutional interests are implicated.”86 In the end, however, Breyer
agreed that the defendants should prevail but only because the plaintiffs’
“privacy expectations [were] unusually low,”87 and “the public interest in
defeating those expectations [was] unusually high.”88 Breyer also noted at
the end of his concurrence that he worried that the majority opinion might
tie the hands of legislators who will struggle in future years to protect
citizens’ privacy interests in a world of new and increasingly
invasive technologies.89
The dissenters echoed Breyer’s concerns about privacy. Chief Justice
Rehnquist, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas, emphasized the
“widespread use and abuse of electronic surveillance techniques”90 and
argued that because the risk of intrusions into people’s private
communications could actually chill speech, robust statutory protections
were warranted.91 By limiting the enforcement of those types of
protections, the majority, Rehnquist wrote, “diminishes, rather than
enhances, the purposes of the First Amendment.”92
B.

Interpretions of Bartnicki

What most people glean from the Court’s decision in Bartnicki is that
journalists and others can publish illegally acquired information, provided
(1) they played no part in the illegal interception; (2) they obtained access
to the information lawfully; and (3) the information relates to a matter of

85. Id. at 536 (asking whether the statutes “strike a reasonable balance between their
speech-restricting and speech-enhancing consequences . . . [o]r do they instead impose restrictions on
speech that are disproportionate when measured against their corresponding privacy and
speech-related benefits”).
86. Id. at 536–37.
87. Id. at 540. Breyer noted that the plaintiffs were both “limited public figures” who “voluntarily
engaged in a public controversy.” Id. at 539.
88. Id. at 540. Breyer explained that there was no unlawful activity by the defendants and no
coordination between them and the interceptor, id. at 538, and that the phone conversation involved
a matter of “unusual public concern” because it included a threat of “physical harm to others,” id.
at 536.
89. Id. at 541.
90. Id. at 542–43 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (quoting S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 67 (1968)).
91. Id. at 543.
92. Id. at 542.
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public concern.93 This is a reasonable takeaway and a paraphrase of what
Justice Stevens wrote in his opinion for the Court. But this unqualified
phrasing of the Bartnicki test blunts the definitional difficulties that
remain, the fact-dependency of the ruling, and its attenuated standing as
precedent in light of the caveats and qualifications in Justice Breyer’s
concurring opinion, which was joined by Justice O’Connor.
Justice Breyer did not specifically object to any of the three
components of the test laid out by Stevens, but he presented a laundry list
of conditions and possible exceptions, which will be referred to here as
the “Breyer contingencies.” With regard to prong one, Breyer noted the
fact that “the broadcasters here engaged in no unlawful activity”94 but
added that the defendants “neither encouraged nor participated directly or
indirectly in the interception”95 and no one “ordered, counseled,
encouraged, or otherwise aided or abetted the interception, the later
delivery of the tape by the interceptor to an intermediary, or the tape’s still
later delivery by the intermediary to the media”96 implying that each of
these could be material and distinguishing facts in other cases. With
regard to prong two, Breyer pointed out that the federal and Pennsylvania
wiretap laws did not make it illegal to receive illegally intercepted
communications,97 something the majority acknowledged as well,98
leaving open the possibility that such a proscription might have changed
the analysis.99 And with regard to prong three, Breyer focused on the fact
that Kane and Bartnicki were “limited public figures”100 and that the
“front porches” comment by Kane was a bona fide threat of violence.101
This is quite different than Stevens’s opinion for the Court, which treated
the entire subject of the conversation as “unquestionably a matter of

93. Id. at 525.
94. Id. at 538 (Breyer, J., concurring).
95. Id. (quoting Petition for Writ of Certiori at 33a, Bartnicki, 532 U.S. 514 (No. 99–1687)).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 525 (majority opinion).
99. The majority is clear, however, that mere knowledge or suspicion that that material was illegally
acquired by someone else is not, by itself, enough to make receipt of the information unlawful. Id. at
532 n.19.
100. Id. at 539 (Breyer, J., concurring). Breyer borrows this phrase from the context of defamation
law. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974) (defining limited public figures
as those who are perhaps not widely known or influential like traditional public figures but who
nevertheless invite “attention and comment” because they “have thrust themselves to the forefront of
particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved”).
101. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 539 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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public concern.”102
Setting aside the complications presented by Breyer’s concurrence,
Stevens’s opinion is indefinite in some respects. With regard to prong one,
Stevens emphasized that reporters who disseminate information of public
interest do not lose their protection because of a “stranger’s illegal
conduct,”103 which suggests that a different result could occur in situations
in which the parties know each other or are engaged in more active
collaboration.104 Clearly, a reporter who personally engages in an illegal
wiretap would lose protection,105 but beyond that, it is not clear where the
line is to be drawn. With regard to prong two, it is still not certain what
constitutes unlawful acquisition of information, nor whether this always
and fully forecloses First Amendment protection.106 Finally, it is not clear
what the Court means by “public concern.” The dissenters, Justices
Rehnquist, Scalia and Thomas, mocked the Court’s reliance on this
“amorphous concept,” which they said Justice Stevens did “not even
attempt to define.”107 Their concern was validated by Stevens’s and
Breyer’s disparate conceptualizations of public concern108 and by the
Court’s terminological inconsistency, using, without distinguishing:
“public interest,”109 “public significance,”110 “public issue[],”111 “public

102. Id. at 535 (majority opinion). Breyer tried to clarify that the Court “does not create a ‘public
interest’ exception that swallows up the . . . rule” but rather “finds constitutional protection for
publication of intercepted information of a special kind.” Id. at 540 (Breyer, J., concurring). This is
correct insofar as it is clearly insufficient to simply claim the presence of an issue of public concern,
but it is incorrect insofar as it suggests that Breyer and Stevens are aligned on the meaning of the term
“public concern.” Stevens took a contextual and categorical approach while Breyer focused on the
public safety threat and the public status of the participants.
103. Id. at 535 (majority opinion) (emphasis added).
104. At several other points in the opinion, the Court uses the phrase “third party” rather than
emphasizing “stranger.” Id. at 525, 528, 530.
105. That is what occurred in Peavy v. WFAA-TV, Inc., 221 F.3d 158 (5th Cir. 2000), one of the
cases that triggered the Court’s grant of certiorari in Bartnicki, and a case the Court distinguishes at
the outset of its opinion. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 522 & n.5.
106. This is a question the Court posed in Pentagon Papers and Florida Star, which the Court has
repeatedly reserved and which it did not fully answer in Bartnicki: “whether, in cases where
information has been acquired unlawfully by a newspaper or by a source, government may ever punish
not only the unlawful acquisition, but the ensuing publication as well.” Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S.
524, 535 n.8 (1989) (emphasis in original).
107. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 542 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
108. See supra text accompanying notes 304–311.
109. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 540 (Breyer, J., concurring).
110. Id. at 527–28 (majority opinion) (quoting Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. 97,
103 (1979)).
111. Id. at 518.
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concern,”112 and “newsworthy.”113 The justices likely understood these to
be synonymous (indeed, those terms are used interchangeably by other
courts and by the authors of this Article), but the Court left unnecessary
confusion by not saying so.114
Bartnicki was clearly an important ruling in that it extended the right
to publish illegally acquired information beyond the prior restraint context
of Pentagon Papers, and Stevens’s opinion for the Court is a strong
defense of the right to publish. But its force is limited by its own
imprecision and by its dependency on the votes of Breyer and O’Connor,
whose separate concurring opinion introduced a series of conditions that
opened the door for less protective applications in the future. The only
things that a majority of justices agreed about were that the right to publish
illegally acquired information must be balanced against competing social
interests (in Bartnicki, the protection of privacy) and that the more
connected a publisher is to illegal activity, or the less connected the
material is to public issues, the more the balance must tilt against the
publisher. Much like with the Court’s divided ruling on the reporter’s
privilege in Branzburg v. Hayes115—in which the decisive fifth vote was
provided by a justice whose concurrence narrowed the reach of the
majority opinion116—the full meaning and impact of Bartnicki has
become a project for the lower courts.
C.

Emerging Cases and the Enduring Confusion About Bartnicki

The initial reaction to Bartnicki by many journalists and lawyers was
jubilant. The effect of the decision was to affirm the rights of journalists
and extend the reach of Pentagon Papers, and because most people
naturally focused on the immediate outcome and on Stevens’s opinion for
the Court, speech and press supporters were thrilled.117 Legal scholars
realized quickly, however, that the decision was replete with uncertainties
and moderating conditions. A number of articles have explored these
idiosyncrasies over the past two decades, both in assessments of the case

112. Id. at 525.
113. Id.
114. The Court has offered at least some additional guidance on the meaning of these terms in
subsequent cases. See supra text accompanying notes 304–311.
115. See supra text accompanying notes 33–37.
116. See supra text accompanying note 36.
117. See, e.g., William R. Self & Minabere Ibelema, Bartnicki v. Vopper: Landmark or Question
Mark, 40 FREE SPEECH Y.B. 13, 13 (2002) (describing some of the excited responses to the ruling).
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itself118 and in studies of related problems.119
Despite these more careful analyses, however, Bartnicki is often
mischaracterized or oversimplified in media analyses of contemporary
controversies. After hackers breached the user data of Ashely Madison—
a dating service marketed to people in pre-existing relationships120—one
analyst suggested that while the hackers clearly broke the law, the press
“can basically run with any information given to them innocently, even if
the person giving it to them obtained it illegally.”121 Likewise, when Terry
Bollea (professional wrestler Hulk Hogan) sued Gawker magazine for
publishing Boella’s illicitly-filmed sex tape, commentators made
similarly sweeping claims. “[T]he law is on Gawker’s side,” a Reuters
legal analyst noted, because the Supreme Court held in Bartnicki that “in
matters of public importance, the First Amendment trumps privacy.”122
These characterizations ignored Justice Breyer’s concurrence, which
treated speech and privacy as comparably important rights,123 and they
presupposed the legitimacy of the public interest in the sex tape. A more
recent Wired analysis of the case against Julian Assange and WikiLeaks

118. See, e.g., id. at 31 (characterizing Bartnicki as “fundamentally flawed and problematic”); see
also Eric B. Easton, Ten Years After: Bartnicki v. Vopper as a Laboratory for First Amendment
Advocacy and Analysis, 50 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 287 (2011) (using the Bartnicki ruling as a kind
of heuristic for understanding the different frameworks courts might apply to the same constitutional
problem); Howard M. Wasserman, Bartnicki as Lochner: Some Thoughts on First Amendment
Lochnerism, 33 N. KY. L. REV. 421 (2006) (rejecting the notion that Bartnicki is an example of the
First Amendment being used to defeat legitimate consumer protection laws); Richard D. Shoop,
Bartnicki v. Vopper, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 449, 449 (2002) (predicting Bartnicki will have less
long-term impact because of the “ambiguity and fragility of the holding”).
119. See, e.g., Jon L. Mills & Kelsey Harclerode, Privacy, Mass Intrusion, and the Modern Data
Breach, 69 FLA. L. REV. 771 (2017) (examining, in part, Bartnicki’s impact on business and personal
privacy); William E. Lee, Probing Secrets: The Press and Inchoate Liability for Newsgathering
Crimes, 36 AM. J. CRIM. L. 129 (2009) (addressing Bartnicki’s limitations in shielding journalists
from criminal liability for seeking classified material); Rodney A. Smolla, Information as
Contraband: The First Amendment and Liability for Trafficking in Speech, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 1099
(2002) (exploring Bartnicki’s possible application and misapplication in a variety of contexts in which
publishers disseminate illegally acquired information).
120. Ashley Madison is a website and dating app that matches people in relationships with others
who are interested in having affairs. See ASHLEY MADISON, https://www.ashleymadison.com/en-us/
[https://perma.cc/C89D-P3GP]. Its assurances of anonymity are naturally an important selling point
of the service.
121. Kate Cox, Why the Stolen Ashley Madison Data Is (Legally) Fair Game for the Internet,
CONSUMERIST (Aug. 25, 2015, 10:23 AM), https://consumerist.com/2015/08/25/why-the-stolenashley-madison-data-is-legally-fair-game-for-the-internet/ [https://perma.cc/4E67-EQH5].
122. Alison Frankel, Why Does Hulk Hogan Even Have a Case Against Gawker?, REUTERS (Mar.
14, 2016), http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/2016/03/14/why-does-hulk-hogan-even-have-acase-against-gawker/ [https://perma.cc/ZP6A-6SBQ].
123. See supra text accompanying note 84.
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shows a similar tendency to erase all nuance.124 Even when the most
knowledgeable sources are consulted, they tend to offer misleadingly
abridged interpretations for lay audiences. Immediately after the Bartnicki
ruling, Yocum’s lawyer, Tom Goldstein, said a key takeaway from the
case was that “if you’re the press, you don’t have to worry about reporting
truthful information of public concern.”125 And one can find many other
examples of thumbnail assessments from media law experts that go too
far in flattening these issues for the public.126
One cannot expect experts, in quotes or soundbites, to convey all of the
complexities of a decision like Bartnicki. Nevertheless, the popular,
received wisdom about Bartnicki, and certainly Pentagon Papers, often
comes in the form of terse absolutes. There is a palpable press-protective
mythos surrounding both of these rulings, which is perhaps the result of
media accounts that tend to wash away the uncertainties. Journalists and
others who share information online have perhaps become unduly
emboldened by this. That was likely true of Gawker editor Nick Denton
whose unrepentant publication of a celebrity sex tape ultimately killed his
whole enterprise.127 Others should heed the Gawker lesson, but also
recognize that even in Pentagon Papers, some justices explicitly left open
the possibility of post-publication charges against The New York Times
for publishing classified material.128 And Bartnicki itself was not a home
run for the press, and perhaps not even a “win.” Indeed, as First
124. Tor Ekeland, The Law Being Used to Prosecute Julian Assange Is Broken, WIRED (May 7,
2019, 9:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/julian-assange-computer-fraud-and-abuse-act/
[https://perma.cc/G35T-5X7Q] (asserting that “Assange and WikiLeaks are publishers just like The
New York Times . . . [a]nd if it was legal for The New York Times to publish the classified Pentagon
Papers detailing the US’ lies when it came to Vietnam, it’s legal for WikiLeaks to do the same”) .
125. Charles Lane, Supreme Court Ruling Supports Media Rights over Privacy Law, WASH. POST
(May 22, 2001), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2001/05/22/supreme-courtruling-supports-media-rights-over-privacy-law/d5e2c04b-f190-4f12-a708-aae1fb69043f/
[https://perma.cc/8P9U-EJ32].
126. One typical example is a story analyzing Jason Pierre-Paul’s lawsuit against Adam Schefter
for publishing part of Pierre-Paul’s medical record that appeared to have been illegally released or
acquired by someone else. The story quotes a media law expert who said, “[a]s long as ESPN did
nothing to procure the documents or aid and abet in their procurement . . . ESPN is in the free and
clear.” Erik Wemple, Twitter Stupidly Freaks Out About ESPN, Jason Pierre-Paul and HIPAA,
WASH. POST (July 9, 2015, 6:17 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/erikwemple/wp/2015/07/09/twitter-stupidly-freaks-out-about-espn-jason-pierre-paul-and-hipaa/
[https://perma.cc/HS5P-X626].
127. Les Neuhaus, Nick Denton, on Stand, Justifies Posting of Hulk Hogan Sex Video, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 15, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/16/business/media/nick-denton-on-standjustifies-posting-of-hulk-hogan-sex-video.html/ [https://perma.cc/9AKW-SX8J].
128. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States (Pentagon Papers), 403 U.S. 713, 735–37 (1971) (White, J.,
concurring) (noting various criminal laws that explicitly prohibit publishing classified and other
sensitive information relating to national security and saying he would have “no difficulty in
sustaining convictions under these [laws]”).
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Amendment scholar Amy Gajda points out, it could actually be viewed as
a 5-4 ruling against the press in the sense that the majority of justices
acknowledged that there are times when speech must yield to privacy.129
All of this points to the need for clarity, partly from news organizations
covering these issues, but more importantly from courts applying these
precedents and shaping new outcomes. The analysis in Part III looks in
more detail at how courts have interpreted and applied Bartnicki over the
past two decades to see if they offer insights for courts confronting a new
wave of cases like the espionage prosecution of Julian Assange, the
criminal hacking prosecutions of Glenn Greenwald130 and Barrett
Brown,131 the DNC data-dumping lawsuits,132 the leak cases like those
involving Donald Trump (tax records),133 Jason Pierre-Paul (medical
records)134 and Jeff Bezos (communication records),135 and some other
emerging cases and scenarios, including the risks faced by average web
users who might seek to share or re-post information online.
III. ANALYSIS OF CASES
The ambiguities of Bartnicki have forced lower courts over the past two
decades to try to clarify and extrapolate from it, much like they did after
Branzburg. A focal point of this Article was to examine all of the federal
and state cases applying Bartnicki to see how lower courts have answered
the questions the Supreme Court left open in 2001, to identify clear or
budding points of consensus, and to see if any new dilemmas have arisen.
The analysis here reveals that courts are deeply divided about the
meaning of every element of the Bartnicki test. There is a circuit split over
the extent to which a publisher can interact with a source before
effectively becoming a primary participant in the illegal acquisition of
information. Courts are also divided about the relevance of legal
prohibitions on receiving or possessing certain information, with some
courts effectively treating certain types of information as contraband and
129. AMY GAJDA, THE FIRST AMENDMENT BUBBLE: HOW PRIVACY AND PAPARAZZI THREATEN A
FREE PRESS 48–49 (2015).
130. See supra note 23.
131. Brown, who had previously been involved with the hacker group Anonymous, spent four years
in jail after posting a link to a trove of files hacked from the cyber-security firm Stratfor, which turned
out to contain some credit card numbers. Russell Brandom, Barrett Brown Has Been Sentenced to 63
Months in Prison, THE VERGE (Jan. 22, 2015, 2:32 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2015/1/22/7871
317/barrett-brown-sentencing-anonymous-stratfor [https://perma.cc/8W99-LDKF].
132. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
133. See infra text accompanying note 229.
134. See supra text accompanying note 22.
135. See supra text accompanying note 21.
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creating legal risks for journalists for merely requesting non-public
records, even when those records are newsworthy and ultimately
furnished by the government. There is also some lingering confusion
about how to assess the newsworthiness of a publication and whether
courts should focus on the newsworthiness of particular facts or the
newsworthiness of the broader context. This is critical in cases involving
large caches of data, like in the DNC hacking cases where courts have
taken diametric approaches to the public concern criterion, with one
saying publishers must demonstrate the newsworthiness of every
disclosed fact, and the other focusing on the macro-level impact of
the whole.
The primary sources for this analysis were the opinions of federal and
state courts that analyzed, discussed, or cited Bartnicki when determining
the case outcome. The time frame used was 2001, the year Bartnicki was
decided, through the end of 2019. The examined cases were gathered
using LexisNexis and Shepard’s Citation Service. The initial search
yielded 229 cases across all jurisdictions, which were then categorized
using Shepard’s depth of discussion indicator (“analyzed,” “discussed,”
“mentioned,” and “cited”). All cases were examined, but many of them,
particularly those that merely cited or mentioned Bartnicki, did not
contain enough relevant analysis or contextual clues to warrant deeper
review. A total of seventeen cases “analyzed” Bartnicki and another
twenty-five “discussed” it.136 The analysis of cases was oriented around
the following questions:
Prong one—What actions have courts treated as “illegal” in applying
prong one? How have lower courts treated the relationship between the
source and publisher and the legal significance of their interactions with
each other? Relatedly, have courts used the Breyer contingencies137 as
bases for withholding First Amendment protection?
Prong two—What do the lower courts regard as unlawful acquisition?
Have courts fully denied First Amendment protection to those who
acquired information unlawfully?
Prong three—What types of information have the courts identified as
being of public concern or not of public concern, and how have they
balanced information of public interest against privacy or other social
interests?
These and other questions are addressed in the subsections below,
along with some discussion of their implications for present as well as

136. There were also a few cases that were examined but that did not have a depth of discussion
label.
137. See supra text accompanying notes 94–96.
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future cases and controversies.
It is important to be clear about the distinctions between prong one and
prong two. The first is about procurement; the second is about receipt and
possession. Lower courts have not always carefully distinguished the two.
In addition, there are two varieties of activity under prong one. For
purposes of this analysis, defendants lose prong one protection when they
directly engage in illegal behavior in order to acquire information in the
first place. This will be referred to here as primary participation. In
addition, some courts have pointed to the narrow facts of Bartnicki and to
some of the language in Stevens’s and Breyer’s opinions to conclude that
a defendant might also fail prong one by indirectly—but too closely—
participating in illegally securing the information by, for example,
collaborating, inducing, encouraging, or supporting that activity. This will
be referred to here as secondary participation.138 Prong two, by contrast,
is less commonly implicated and only involves situations in which, like in
Bartnicki, the defendant was not involved in the initial procuring of the
information but where, unlike in Bartnicki, their receipt or possession of
the information was specifically proscribed by law.139
A.

Bartnicki Prong One: Publisher-Source Interaction

Although the Supreme Court in Bartnicki upheld the rights of both
Yocum as the intermediary and Vopper as the publisher, it clearly had no
sympathy for whoever initially broke the law by intercepting the
Kane-Bartnicki phone conversation. That person engaged in a clear
violation of the wiretap statutes, and the privacy-protection justifications
for punishing those actions were substantial and self-evident. This aspect
of the Court’s opinion is supported by a long line of cases denying legal
immunity to journalists or others whose newsgathering activities violate
generally applicable laws.140 Many of the post-Bartnicki cases have turned
on this aspect of prong one. The application of Bartnicki in those cases
has been relatively straightforward because they involved defendants who
acted illegally in procuring the information and were the first link in
the chain.
138. A key question for this analysis is whether a secondary participant is eligible for Bartnicki
protection, and what types of secondary participation fall within the ambit of Bartnicki.
139. Because both prong one and two involve unlawful activity—under prong one, unlawfulness
in securing the information in the first place, and under prong two, unlawfulness in receiving or
possessing the information—the courts sometimes blur the two. See, e.g., Lowe v. Hearst Commc’ns,
Inc., 403 F. Supp. 2d 568, 576 (W.D. Tex. 2005) (noting that in one case a defendant participated in
an illegal interception and therefore “did not lawfully receive the contents” (emphasis in original)),
superseded, 414 F. Supp. 2d 669 (W.D. Tex. 2006).
140. See supra text accompanying notes 40–44.
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In In re Zyprexa Injunction,141 for example, a federal district court in
New York rejected the invocation of Bartnicki by lawyers seeking to resist
a court order compelling them to return, and cease distributing, court
documents that were under a protective order.142 In Council on
American-Islamic Relations Action Network, Inc. v. Gaubatz,143 a
different federal district court held that a defendant who lied to get an
internship at a private organization could not rely on Bartnicki to shield
him from liability for accessing and publishing the organization’s private
records.144 In State v. Baron,145 the Wisconsin Supreme Court denied
Bartnicki protection to a defendant who distributed his supervisor’s
private emails after gaining unauthorized access to the supervisor’s
computer and email account.146 And in Bowens v. Ary, Inc.,147 the
Michigan Court of Appeals denied Bartnicki protection to defendants who
had illegally recorded, and later distributed, video and audio of a
backstage dispute between musicians and police.148 In all of these cases,
the defendants directly participated in the illegal acquisition of
information and were not merely recipients of information captured
by others.
Some courts, like the First Circuit,149 have framed Bartnicki in simple
terms: people are free to disclose illegally intercepted information
provided they have not “participated in the interception.”150 But decisions
by other courts, including two circuit courts,151 show there is no bright
141. 474 F. Supp. 2d 385 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).
142. Id. at 420–22. The documents were part of a class-action lawsuit against Eli Lilly & Co.,
maker of the drug Zyprexa. The lawyers, who were participants in the case, leaked the documents to
journalists and others, and parts were shared on websites and in news reports. The only surviving
injunction in this case was aimed at the lawyers, not the journalists or subsequent publishers. Id.
at 427.
143. 793 F. Supp. 2d 311 (D.D.C. 2011).
144. Id. at 331–32. In that case, the defendant’s actions also violated the confidentiality agreement
he signed as a condition of his employment. Id. at 342–44.
145. 2009 WI 58, 318 Wis. 2d 60, 769 N.W.2d 34.
146. Id. ¶¶ 55–56, 318 Wis. 2d at 87–88, 769 N.W.2d at 48.
147. No. 282711, 2009 Mich. App. LEXIS 2000 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 24, 2009).
148. Id. at *20–22. After musicians had been preparing to show sexually explicit material during a
concert performance, police intervened and, during a backstage discussion, were recorded by
defendants while conversing with performers and managers. The recordings, which violated the
wiretap laws, were later included on a DVD that was subsequently distributed by the band. Id. at
*1–2.
149. See, e.g., IMS Health Inc. v. Ayotte, 550 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2008) (holding that a New
Hampshire statute prohibiting certain transfers of physician’s prescribing history did not violate First
Amendment rights of data miners).
150. Id. at 51.
151. Boehner v. McDermott (Boehner II), 441 F.3d 1010 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (holding that that a
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line here. A determinative feature of Bartnicki was certainly the
disconnection between Vopper and the person who illegally intercepted
the Kane-Bartnicki phone call. Similarly, in Pentagon Papers, the
separation between the source (Daniel Ellsberg) and the newspapers made
the case a simpler one for the justices.152 In Bartnicki, Justice Stevens’s
opinion highlighted the fact that the illegal interception was committed by
a stranger and someone who was further separated from Vopper by an
intermediary, Yocum.153 Stevens did not limit his opinion to cases in
which the interceptor and publisher were so far removed, but by not
drawing a clear line, he left a crack in the door that Breyer pushed open
by flagging a set of alternative conditions that, if present, might warrant
different outcomes.154 Justice Breyer implied that a stronger link of
liability might be forged between source and publisher in situations in
which the publisher ordered, counseled, encouraged, or aided and abetted
the illegal acquisition or the subsequent transfer of records from one node
to another.155 If lower courts have indeed seized on Breyer’s
contingencies, it could have significant implications for many defendants,
including Julian Assange, who had many direct interactions with his
source, Chelsea Manning.156
The first federal circuit case applying Bartnicki was by the Tenth
Circuit in Quigley v. Rosenthal.157 That case involved a fierce dispute
between neighbors in which a Jewish couple, the Aronsons, claimed their
neighbors, the Quigleys, were trying to run them out of the neighborhood.
The Aronsons repeatedly intercepted and recorded the Quigleys’ home
phone calls, capturing the Quigleys making what the Aronsons believed
were anti-Semitic and threatening comments.158 The Aronsons consulted
lawyers for the Anti-Defamation League who eventually filed civil claims
on behalf of the Aronsons against the Quigleys, incorporating excerpts
from the illegally intercepted phone conversations.159 The Quigleys
Congressman who knowingly disclosed unlawfully intercepted communications in violation of
federal statute was not entitled to First Amendment protections); Quigley v. Rosenthal, 327 F.3d 1044
(10th Cir. 2003) (finding that the application of a federal wiretap act did not violate defendants’ First
Amendment rights).
152. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States (Pentagon Papers), 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
153. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 535 (2001).
154. See supra text accompanying notes 94–96. Breyer also notes that the wiretap laws did not
forbid the receipt of intercepted communications, supra text accompanying note 97, an issue that is
more relevant to prong two and discussed in the next section.
155. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 538 (Breyer, J., concurring); see supra text accompanying notes 94–96.
156. See infra text accompanying notes 230–232.
157. 327 F.3d 1044 (10th Cir. 2003).
158. Id. at 1052.
159. Id. at 1052–53.
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subsequently filed their own claims against various defendants, including
the ADL, which the Quigleys accused of violating the state and federal
wiretap laws when its lawyers used the illegally intercepted calls in their
court filings on behalf of the Aronsons.160 The ADL invoked Bartnicki,
but the Tenth Circuit concluded that it was distinguishable, in part
because, unlike Yocum and Vopper, the ADL “knew that the Aronsons
were the ones responsible for recording the Quigleys’ telephone
conversations” and knew that “the Aronsons were continuing to record
the Aronsons’ telephone conversations.”161
The Tenth Circuit’s conclusion is plainly inconsistent with Stevens’s
Bartnicki opinion, which acknowledges that the defendants knew or had
reason to know that the Kane-Bartnicki call had been illegally
intercepted.162 The Tenth Circuit effectively splits this phrase, however,
implying that those who merely have “reason to know” about the illegal
interception can invoke the First Amendment while those who are more
certain about it may not.163 The Tenth Circuit was correct that the two
cases are factually distinct—in one, the defendants had actual knowledge
of illegal interception (Quigley), and in the other, they merely suspected
it (Bartnicki)—but there is nothing in Stevens’s opinion, either by itself
or read together with Breyer’s concurrence, to suggest that this distinction
has constitutional relevance. In fact, it contradicts the fifth sentence of
Stevens’s opinion for the Court in which he conjoins knowledge and
suspicion by presenting them as gradations of the same condition.164
Nevertheless, a few years later, another federal circuit, the D.C. Circuit,
applied similar logic in perhaps the most high-profile post-Bartnicki
ruling—Boehner v. McDermott (Boehner II).165 The Boehner litigation
ran parallel to the Bartnicki litigation but was not ultimately resolved until
2007 after multiple rulings, appeals, and remands.166 The case involved a
civil claim filed under the federal wiretap law by Republican
Representative John Boehner against Democratic Representative James
160. Id. at 1056.
161. Id. at 1067. The court further distinguished Bartnicki by suggesting that the Quigley phone
calls did not involve matters of public concern. Id.
162. Bartnicki v.Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 517–18 (2001) (“The persons who made the disclosures
did not participate in the interception, but they did know—or at least had reason to know—that the
interception was unlawful.”).
163. Quigley, 327 F.3d at 1078.
164. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 517–18.
165. Boehner II, 441 F.3d 1010 (D.C. Cir. 2006). The case was finally resolved later after an en
banc review. Boehner v. McDermott (Boehner III), 484 F.3d 573 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc).
166. For a full account of this case’s journey through the courts, prior to the final en banc ruling of
the D.C. Circuit, see William R. Self, Boehner v. McDermott: Full Appeals Court Avoids Attempting
to Solve the Riddle of Bartnicki v. Vopper, 43 FREE SPEECH Y.B. 154 (2006).
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McDermott.167 A married couple, the Martins, used a radio scanner to
illegally intercept and record a private conference call between Boehner
and other members of Congress, including Republican Representative
Newt Gingrich, in which they discussed the disposition of a House Ethics
Committee punishment of Gingrich, and revealed that Gingrich might
have violated his settlement agreement with the committee.168 The couple
gave a tape of the call to McDermott who subsequently contacted two
reporters, played the tape for them, and allowed them to make their
own recordings.169
In its penultimate ruling on this case, Boehner II, a panel of the D.C.
Circuit ruled in favor of Boehner and highlighted the fact that, unlike the
defendants in Bartnicki, McDermott knew (rather than merely suspected)
that the information given to him had been illegally intercepted.170 “The
difference between this case and Bartnicki is plain to see,” Judge
Randolph wrote for the court. “It is the difference between someone who
discovers a bag containing a diamond ring on the sidewalk and someone
who accepts the same bag from a thief, knowing the ring inside to have
been stolen.”171 This is a plainly specious argument because the wiretap
law did not outlaw the mere possession of intercepted communications,
and courts have also been reluctant to treat information as property.172 The
D.C. Circuit, then, like the Tenth, treated the certainty of the defendants’
knowledge of the illegal acquisition as a constitutionally significant factor
in applying and distinguishing Bartnicki.
In Boehner II, D.C. Circuit also highlighted a related factor: the
anonymity of the interceptor. In Bartnicki, the defendants never knew who
recorded the original phone call. The D.C. Circuit suggests that this was
significant because “[t]he Court mentioned the anonymity of the
interceptor several times” in its opinion.173 Justice Stevens’s opinion does
167. Boehner II, 441 F.3d at 1011.
168. Id. at 1012.
169. Id. at 1012–13. The reporters later published news stories based on the recordings. Id.
170. Id. at 1016. The Martins had written an explanatory note on the outside the envelope
explaining its contents. Id. at 1012. McDermott denied having read it. Id. at 1015–16 Nevertheless,
McDermott was later quoted in a newspaper story about the recording in which he indicated it had
been captured using a radio scanner. Id. at 1016. He could only have known this, the court concluded,
from either his direct contacts with the Martins or from the note on the envelope. Id. at 1016–17.
Either way, the Court held that the evidence supported the conclusion that McDermott knew the
recording he shared with reporters had been illegally acquired. Id.
171. Id. at 1017.
172. See, e.g., Pearson v. Dodd, 410 F.2d 701, 708 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (concluding that information
should not be treated as property except in situations in which it constitutes a literary work, scientific
invention or the like).
173. Boehner II, 441 F. 3d at 1014 (citing Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 525, 530, 530 n.15,
531, 535 (2001)).
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refer to the interceptor as a stranger, and his opinion concludes by noting
that “a stranger’s illegal conduct does not suffice to remove the First
Amendment shield from speech about a matter of public concern.”174 But
Stevens never suggests or implies that an interceptor must be anonymous
for a publisher to invoke the First Amendment. Indeed, he just as
frequently uses terms such as “third party”175 or “another.”176
A year after Boehner II, the D.C. Circuit granted an appeal for a
rehearing en banc and issued its final judgment in the case in Boehner v.
McDermott (Boehner III),177 with four judges, led by Randolph, siding
with Boehner, four judges, led by Sentelle, siding with McDermott, and
one judge, Griffith, concurring.178 This time Judge Randolph tethered his
opinion to an entirely different rationale—the fact that McDermott had a
special duty as a member of the ethics committee not to disclose
confidential material.179 “When Representative McDermott became a
member of the Ethics Committee,” Judge Randolph wrote, “he voluntarily
accepted a duty of confidentiality that covered his receipt and handling of
the Martins’ illegal recording. He therefore had no First Amendment right
to disclose the tape to the media.”180 Because Judge Randolph oriented his
argument around this point, he never revisited the issues of knowledge or
direct contact he stressed in Boehner II.181 Judge Sentelle, however, not
wanting to leave those specious assertions unchallenged, wrote a strong
dissent in Boehner III, emphasizing that the panel’s rationale in
Boehner II could not stand as a matter of law or logic. Sentelle argued that
there is no constitutionally significant difference between the facts of

174. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 535.
175. Id. at 529–30 (“But it would be quite remarkable to hold that speech by a law-abiding
possessor of information can be suppressed in order to deter conduct by a non-law-abiding
third party.”).
176. Id. at 530.
177. 484 F.3d 573 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc).
178. Judge Randolph’s opinion was joined by Chief Judge Ginsburg, Judge Henderson, and Judge
Brown. Id. at 574–75. Judge Sentelle’s dissent was joined by Judges Rogers, Tatel and Garland. Id.
at 581 (Sentelle, J., dissenting). Judge Griffith concurred, joining Part I of Judge Randolph’s opinion
in which the court ruled in favor of Boehner. Id. at 575 (majority opinion); id. at 581 (Griffith, J.,
concurring in part).
179. Id. at 581 (majority opinion).
180. Id.; see also discussion infra section III.B.
181. Boehner II, 441 F.3d 1010, 1016 (2006). These issues were stressed again by the district court
that heard the remand of the case, the appeal of which became Boehner III. Boehner v. McDermott,
332 F. Supp. 2d 149, 168–69 (D.D.C. 2004) (“In the instant case, however, McDermott actively
accepted the tape from the people who had illegally recorded it” and in doing so “participated in an
illegal transaction” and therefore “he is without First Amendment protection.”).
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Bartnicki and Boehner.182
In both cases, the defendant publisher knew or had reason to know that
the information had been illegally intercepted, and there is nothing in the
Bartincki opinion to suggest that the outcome would be different had the
defendants known the identity of the interceptor or been more certain
about the illegality of the original interception.183 In his decisive
concurring opinion, Judge Griffith joined the majority in finding that the
First Amendment was inapplicable because of McDermott’s overriding
duty of non-disclosure; however, he noted that but for that condition, he
would have found McDermott’s disclosure to be protected by the First
Amendment.184 In the final analysis, a slight majority of the judges of the
D.C. Circuit rejected the notion that one surrenders Bartnicki protection
by virtue of knowing the identity of the original interceptor or knowing
with certainty that the material was illegally acquired.
That same year, the First Circuit mirrored the Sentelle interpretation in
Jean v. Massachusetts State Police.185 In Jean, a woman whose home was
being searched by police, recorded the police without their knowledge
using a nanny-cam.186 The footage included audio of the officers’
conversations with each other and with the homeowner, which made the
recording illegal under the Massachusetts wiretap law.187 The
homeowner, who believed the search to be unjustified, sent the recording
to Mary Jean, who operated a website monitoring police misconduct.188
After the footage was posted online, the police sought to have it removed,
but Jean was able to secure an injunction prohibiting any interference with
the website.189
Aside from the posture of the case (the merits of an injunction), the
facts closely matched those in Bartnicki. The homeowner plainly violated
the wiretap law, but Jean played no role in the illegal recording. The
police, relying on Justice Breyer’s Bartnicki concurrence and paralleling
the arguments from Quigley and Boehner II, argued that Jean was
differently situated than Vopper because she was aware of the identity of
the illegal interceptor, had direct contact with her, and knew with certainty

182. Boehner III, 484 F.3d at 584 (Sentelle, J., dissenting) (“There is no distinction of legal, let
alone constitutional, significance between our facts and those before the Court in Bartnicki.”)
183. Id. at 581–87.
184. Id. at 581 (Griffith, J., concurring in part).
185. 492 F.3d 24 (1st Cir. 2007).
186. Id. at 25.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 24–25.
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that the recording was made in violation of the law.190 The court
concluded that none of these was a material fact.191 It is true that in
Bartnicki, Yocum received the recording blindly, which is different than
Jean, who consulted directly with the homeowner,192 but, the First Circuit
wrote, “the fact that Yocum received the tape ‘passively’ and Jean
received the tape ‘actively’ is a distinction without a difference.”193 The
First Circuit further rejected the notion that simple logistical
communications between Jean and the homeowner about publication
somehow conjoined them for purposes of wiretap-law culpability. Finally,
the court acknowledged Justice Breyer’s concurrence but declined to use
it as the basis for a narrower reading of Bartnicki.194
One federal district court applying Bartnicki aptly noted “that the more
involvement journalists have in obtaining information by illegal means,
the more likely their publication of that material will not receive First
Amendment protection.”195 But there is a circuit split about how to bridge
the extremes—at one end, situations in which a publisher breaks the law
to acquire information, and at the other end, situations like Bartnicki
where the publisher is fully removed from the illegal acquisition. The
Tenth Circuit in Quigley offered one approach, saying publishers lose
Bartnicki protection if they know the information provided by a source
was illegally obtained.196 Four of the nine D.C. Circuit judges who sat en
banc in Boehner III agreed, adding that the same would be true if the
publisher had personal interactions with the sources who provided the
illegally acquired information.197 Judge Hogan’s district court decision

190. Id. at 31–32.
191. Id. at 32.
192. Indeed, the Third Circuit even acknowledged that Jean and the homeowner engaged in a
“conspiracy” to disclose the recording, but the court concluded that it was of no constitutional
relevance. Id. at 31–32.
193. Id. at 32.
194. Id. at 33 (concluding that “the precise scope of [that] language is uncertain” but that in any
case Jean’s actions did not fit any of the possible exceptions noted by Breyer).
195. Lowe v. Hearst Commc’ns, Inc., 403 F. Supp. 2d 568, 576 (W.D. Tex. 2005), superseded, 414
F. Supp. 2d 669 (W.D. Tex. 2006).
196. Quigley v. Rosenthal, 327 F.3d 1044, 1067 (10th Cir. 2003). Some lower courts applying
Bartnicki have addressed the issue of knowledge, but only to consider whether the defendants even
knew the information they were publishing had been illegally obtained or that its dissemination was
prohibited. See, e.g., Wingrave v. Hebert, 2006-1240 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/9/07); 964 So. 2d 385 (finding
no clear evidence that defendant knew information she distributed had been illegally intercepted);
DVD Copy Control Ass’n v. Bunner, 75 P.3d 1 (Cal. 2003) (addressing issue of knowledge of illegal
acquisition but only to establish basis for underlying tort claim of trade secret misappropriation).
197. Boehner III, 484 F.3d 573, 577–79 (D.C. Cir. 2007). The only path to reconcile Quigley with
Bartnicki is to argue that the latter involved mere suspicion of illegality whereas in the former the
defendants were certain, and that this is a legally significant distinction.
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preceding Boehner II and Boehner III also supported this interpretation.198
But five of the nine judges on the D.C. Circuit in Boehner III, and a
unanimous panel of the First Circuit, said that neither of those
conditions—knowledge of illegal acquisition nor personal contact
between publisher and source—is sufficient to remove the Bartnicki
shield, although it is not clear how much further they might be willing to
extend protections.199
There is one more federal circuit decision that offers some guidance—
Peavy v. WFAA-TV, Inc.200—decided just prior to Bartnicki. In that case,
a reporter had been in close consultation with a couple who had been
illegally intercepting and recording their neighbor’s phone calls, believing
that the neighbor (Carver Dan Peavy) was engaged in criminal activity.
The reporter sought to expose Peavy, relying on information gleaned from
the couple’s recordings.201 The reporter spoke with the couple regularly
for months, often meeting them at their house, occasionally listening to
the recorded conversations with them, and providing some technical
advice to them about recording techniques.202 The Fifth Circuit denied the
reporter’s First Amendment defense, and the Supreme Court subsequently
denied certiorari following its decision in Bartnicki.203 Although the Court
never addressed the merits of the Fifth Circuit’s decision, Justice
Stevens’s opinion did note that in Peavy, unlike Bartnicki, the “media
defendant in fact participated in the interceptions at issue.”204
Peavy provides an example of a situation in which a court might
withhold First Amendment protection because of a too-close connection
between reporters and sources, even where the reporter is one step
removed from the actual procurement. It is perhaps the kind of situation
Breyer had in mind when he implied that liability might attach to those
who encourage illegal acquisition or participate in it, “directly or
indirectly.”205 Other lower courts have not deeply explored the gradations
of this kind of secondary participation, however, so while the loophole

198. Boehner v. McDermott, 332 F. Supp. 2d 149, 168 (D.D.C. 2004).
199. Boehner III, 484 F.3d at 581 (Griffith, J., concurring in the result) (noting that he agreed with
the minority and would find the disclosure protected under Bartnicki if not for the House ethics rules
violations); Jean v. Mass. State Police, 492 F.3d 24, 33 (1st Cir. 2007) (finding Bartnicki applied to
the knowing publication of an illegally intercepted recording).
200. 221 F.3d 158 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1051 (2001).
201. Id. at 164–65.
202. Id. at 164–67.
203. Id. at 194; Order Denying Certiorari, Peavy v. WFAA-TV, Inc., 532 U.S. 1051 (2001).
204. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 522 n.5 (2001) (emphasis added).
205. Id. at 538 (Breyer, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
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Breyer created has not been exploited by plaintiffs,206 it has not been
closed either.207
That lingering uncertainty is consequential because the issue of
reporter-source (or interceptor-publisher) proximity is at the center of
several emerging cases. It was explored in the 2019 federal district court
rulings in both of the Democratic National Committee (DNC) hacking
cases—one case brought by DNC donors and staffers against the Trump
Campaign (Cockrum v. Donald J. Trump for President, Inc.208) and the
other brought by the DNC itself against the Russian Federation and a
number of secondary defendants, including the Trump Campaign,
WikiLeaks, Roger Stone, Donald Trump, Jr., Julian Assange and Jared
Kushner (Democratic National Committee (DNC) v. Russian
Federation209). In Cockrum, which involved defendants’ motion to
dismiss, Judge Hudson found the evidence to be “more than ample” to at
least establish a “plausible factual basis” for the plaintiff’s claim that the
defendants coordinated with the Russian hackers.210 As a result, Hudson
distinguished Bartnicki based on prong one, noting that “[h]ere, unlike
Bartnicki, the Campaign is alleged to have conspired with the Kremlin
and WikiLeaks.”211 Judge Hudson muddled the issue, however, by saying
that this evidence demonstrates that the “Campaign was aware that the
stolen information had been unlawfully obtained.”212 Hudson therefore

206. In Quigley v. Rosenthal, the Tenth Circuit noted that during a meeting between the Aronsons
and their lawyers, “[t]he attendees . . . agreed that the Aronsons should continue recording the
Quigleys’ telephone conversations.” 327 F.3d 1044, 1052 (10th Cir. 2003). This appeared to be
evidence that the lawyers encouraged the illegal interception of information by the Aronsons, which
aligns with one of the Breyer contingencies, Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 538 (Breyer, J., concurring), but
the court never returned to this point, perhaps because it has already established that mere knowledge
of illegal acquisition was sufficient to deny Bartnicki protection. In some other cases, it also appeared
that there might have been some interaction and coordination between sources and publishers, but
either the court did not elaborate, or the facts were unclear. See, e.g., Lowe v. Hearst Commc’ns, Inc.,
403 F. Supp. 2d 568, 571 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (noting factual dispute about how defendant news
organization obtained sealed court records), superseded, 414 F. Supp. 2d 669 (W.D. Tex. 2006).
207. Indeed, the Seventh Circuit case Dahlstrom v. Sun-Times Media, LLC puts considerable
emphasis on the Breyer concurrence in denying First Amendment protection to reporters, but with a
focus on the second prong of the Bartnicki test. 777 F.3d 937, 953 (7th Cir. 2015); see also discussion
infra section III.B.
208. 365 F. Supp. 3d 652 (E.D. Va. 2019).
209. 392 F. Supp. 3d 410 (S.D.N.Y. 2019).
210. Cockrum, 365 F. Supp. 3d at 658. Judge Hudson granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss
all of the claims but without any further discussion of Bartnicki, because the claims were
unsustainable for other reasons. Id. at 672.
211. Id. at 657.
212. Id. at 658 (emphasis added).
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confused active collaboration with knowledge of illegal acquisition.213
Ultimately, Hudson concluded that based on the available evidence, “the
Campaign’s release of the hacked emails from the DNC do not warrant
First Amendment protection.”214
In the DNC case, however, Judge Koeltl interpreted Bartnicki in the
broadest possible terms, framing the issue as a simple distinction between
“stealing documents and disclosing documents that someone else had
stolen previously.”215 He acknowledged the plaintiffs’ claim that the
various secondary defendants “actively supported and approved the
Russian operation,”216 but noted that all of this occurred after the emails
had already been hacked. Because the DNC “failed to allege plausibly that
any of the other defendants participated in the hack or theft,”217 or that
they conspired to do so before the incidents occurred,218 they are entitled
to First Amendment protection under Bartnicki. Judge Koeltl observed
that the plaintiffs’ strongest claim was against WikiLeaks because it was
the only one of the secondary defendants to have actually published the
stolen emails and because WikiLeaks actually solicited the emails via
direct communication with the Russians.219 The plaintiffs argued that
WikiLeaks could not claim Bartnicki protection because it knowingly
published stolen information. But Judge Koeltl, citing Boehner III and
Jean, concluded that it is “constitutionally insignificant that WikiLeaks
knew the Russian Federation had stolen the documents when it published
them.”220 It is also irrelevant, he added, that WikiLeaks solicited the
emails from the Russians. Soliciting stolen documents is a common
journalistic practice, Judge Koeltl asserted, and to hold WikiLeaks liable
for doing so would “eviscerate Bartnicki.”221 The solicitation by
WikiLeaks occurred after the documents had already been stolen, and
indeed after the Russians had already started to distribute them. “This was
not a solicitation to steal documents but a request for material,” Judge
Koeltl concluded, adding that “[j]ournalists are allowed to request

213. An alternative explanation is that Judge Hudson meant only that the collaboration served to
alert the campaign about the illegal interception, not that the campaign coordinated more directly with
the hackers.
214. Cockrum, 365 F. Supp. 3d at 659.
215. Democratic Nat’l Comm. (DNC) v. Russian Fed’n, 392 F. Supp. 3d 410, 431 (S.D.N.Y. 2019).
216. Id. at 421.
217. Id. at 434.
218. Id. at 435.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 434 (first citing Boehner III, 484 F.3d 573, 585 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Sentelle, J., dissenting);
and then citing Jean v. Mass. State Police, 492 F.3d 24, 31 (1st Cir. 2007)).
221. Id. at 435.
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documents that have been stolen and to publish those documents.”222
In another 2019 case, Allen v. Beirich,223 a different federal district
court judge cited DNC and mirrored its analysis, holding that defendants
could not be liable for publishing illegally leaked documents despite
knowing the documents were stolen, coordinating with the person who
stole them, and paying that person $5,000 as a reward.224 None of these
facts was constitutionally significant, the court held, in part because the
coordination and payment occurred after the source had already stolen the
documents.225 For both Judge Koeltl, who decided DNC,226 and Judge
Blake, who decided Allen, the key distinction is between before-the-fact
participation, conspiracy or solicitation, on the one hand, and
after-the-fact solicitation on the other. To Judge Hudson, however, who
decided Cockrum, any of the above conditions could conceivably negate
the protection.
This division and imprecision pervades the post-Bartnicki case law and
creates uneven legal terrain for potential defendants like columnist
Nicholas Kristof, who arguably engaged in before-the-fact solicitation by
tweeting out a request in 2017 for leaks of Donald Trump’s tax records.227
Reporters for The New York Times could also be vulnerable. In May 2019,
the Times published a story about Trump’s previous financial losses that
was based on a leak of parts of ten years of Trump’s tax returns.228 And in
October 2020, the Times published a series of stories exploring different
aspects of Trump’s finances, again based on leaked tax records.229 The
Times’s sources are not known, but if Times’s reporters asked those
sources for the records, the reporters’ actions would fall outside of the
zone of Bartnicki protection suggested by Judge Hogan.
The problems are more serious for Julian Assange, whom prosecutors

222. Id. at 436 (first citing Jean v. Mass. State Police, 492 F.3d 24, 31 (1st Cir. 2007); then citing
N.Y. Times Co. v. United States (Pentagon Papers), 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971); and then citing
Nicholson v. McClatchy Newspapers, 177 Cal. App. 3d 509, 521 (1986)).
223. No. CCB-18-3781, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 197183 (D. Md. Nov. 13, 2019).
224. Id. at *24.
225. Id. at *16–18.
226. DNC, 392 F. Supp. 3d at 451.
227. See Kristof, supra note 20; supra text accompanying note 20.
228. Russ Buettner & Susanne Craig, Decade in the Red: Trump Tax Figures Show over $1 Billion
in Business Losses, N.Y. TIMES (May 8, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/05/07/us
/politics/donald-trump-taxes.html [https://perma.cc/PY9H-9HBF].
229. Russ Buettner, Susanne Craig & Mike McIntire, Long-Concealed Records Show Trump’s
Chronic Losses and Years of Tax Avoidance, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/09/27/us/donald-trump-taxes.html?smid=twnytimes&amp;smtyp=cur [https://perma.cc/RM5L-TBGV].
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say had sustained and detailed contacts with Chelsea Manning before230
and during231 the transfer of classified data to WikiLeaks. The Assange
indictment repeatedly mentions the word “encourage,” suggesting that in
the government’s view, before-the-fact encouragement of illegal leaks by
sources is enough to warrant withholding First Amendment protection,
but that, in any case, Assange went well beyond that by actively
collaborating with Manning.232 For Assange to succeed, then, he will first
have to convince the court to apply an interpretation of Bartnicki that
reserves liability for those who actively conspire with their sources. (This
Article largely supports this approach,233 and it is not precluded by
Stevens’s opinion for the Court, but is harder to square with Breyer’s
concurrence and some subsequent precedent). Assange will then have to
persuade that court that his interactions with Manning fell short of
that line.234
B.

Bartnicki Prong Two: Unlawful Acquisition

The second condition for claiming Bartnicki protection is that the
publisher obtained the information “lawfully,”235 and like with prong one,
courts have applied it inconsistently. Although some courts have blurred
the distinction between prong one and two,236 prong two applies only to
situations in which a publisher received information from a third party
where the receipt or possession of that information was itself proscribed
by law.
One of the most restrictive interpretations of prong two came from the
230. The indictment notes that Manning’s first involvement with WikiLeaks was to search for
specific classified records (e.g., CIA detainee interrogation videos) sought by WikiLeaks via a “Most
Wanted Leaks” appeal on its website. The website also solicited records in “bulk databases and
military and intelligence categories,” which is what Manning ultimately provided to WikiLeaks—full
databases of war-related activity reports from Iraq and Afghanistan, Guantanamo Bay detainee
records, and about a quarter million State Department cables. Assange Superseding Indictment, supra
note 6, at 5–6.
231. The government alleges that Assange and Manning engaged in regular correspondence, id. at
6, and that Assange continued to encourage the leak of additional records after receiving the first
batches, id. at 6–7, which Assange knew were classified, id. at 9, and might put individuals at risk,
id. at 26. The indictment also alleges Assange offered technical advice to Manning about how to
circumvent password protections. Id. at 7.
232. The words “encourage” or “encouraged” appear ten different times in the first superseding
indictment. Assange Superseding Indictment, supra note 6. The second superseding indictment
focuses less on Manning but nevertheless charges Assange with conspiring with Manning. See
Assange Second Superseding Indictment, supra note 6.
233. See infra section IV.B.
234. See discussion infra section IV.B.
235. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 525 (2001).
236. See supra note 139.
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Seventh Circuit in Dahlstrom v. Sun-Times Media, LLC237 in 2015. That
case was based on the actions of Chicago Sun-Times reporters who were
covering a criminal investigation of the nephew of the mayor of Chicago.
In order to prove that lookalike “fillers” were used in a police lineup to
make the nephew difficult to identify, the reporters sought information
about the men, in part by requesting their motor vehicle records from the
office of the Secretary of State.238 Officials in that office then supplied the
records without objection or qualification.239 After the reporters included
some of this information in their subsequent reporting, several police
officers, who were among the fillers, sued the Sun-Times based on the
reporters’ alleged violation of the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act
(DPPA).240 That law prohibits knowingly obtaining or disclosing personal
information from motor vehicle records.241 The Seventh Circuit panel
concluded that the Sun-Times could be held liable because it was
technically unlawful to acquire such records, so the paper did not qualify
for Bartnicki protection. The Seventh Circuit focused solely on the
reporters’ pursuit of protected records, ignoring the intervening actions of
the records custodians and treating the case as one without
an intermediary.
The Dahlstrom decision was mystifying, in part because the facts
largely paralleled those of the Supreme Court’s decision in Florida Star,
which the Seventh Circuit blithely tried to distinguish. In Florida Star, a
woman had been raped, and an unredacted report of the incident, which
contained her full name, was accidentally placed in a press room by an
employee of the sheriff’s department.242 A reporter then copied the report
and subsequently published the victim’s name in the paper, which violated
state law.243 The Supreme Court held that the reporter obtained the
information lawfully, even though the record included information that
was not meant to be public, and even though the government officials
violated their own statutory obligations by releasing it. This is precisely
what happed in Dahlstrom: information that was not meant to be public
was mistakenly made available to the press by records custodians in
237. 777 F.3d 937 (7th Cir. 2015).
238. Id. at 940.
239. Id.
240. 18 U.S.C. § 2721.
241. Id. § 2722(a) (“It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to obtain or disclose personal
information, from a motor vehicle record . . . .”).
242. Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 527 (1989).
243. Id. The statute in that case prohibited government officials from releasing the names of rape
victims, and it also authorized penalties for anyone who published such information. Id. at 526 n.1.
The latter provision was struck down by the Court as a violation of the right to publish lawfully
obtained information about matters of public interest. Id. at 526.
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violation of the statute. The Seventh Circuit glossed over these similarities
by saying the paper in Florida Star obtained the private information from
“a public police report.”244 But that report was no more public than the
information provided to Sun-Times reporters in Dahlstrom. And, as the
Court noted in Florida Star, “the fact that state officials are not required
to disclose such reports does not make it unlawful for a newspaper to
receive them when furnished by the government.”245 Nor does the
violation of the law by the records custodians make “the newspaper’s
ensuing receipt of this information unlawful.”246
The Seventh Circuit suggests that a material difference in Dahlstrom is
that “the acquirer and publisher are one and the same.”247 The court seems
to assume that the Supreme Court would have decided Florida Star
differently if the reporter in that case had first asked for the non-public
information, and then the government employee mistakenly provided it.
That seems implausible, and it would require the same kind of logic that
other courts have rejected248 in their analyses of prong one: that in order
to invoke Bartnicki, reporters must be oblivious about the provenance of
the material they acquired.
In any case, such a rule would present another problem that the
Supreme Court highlighted in Florida Star: it would shift the burden of
determining what is private under the statute from records custodians to
records requesters and would subject the requesters to civil and criminal
penalties if they guess wrong.249 The Seventh Circuit’s Dahlstrom
analysis also flies in the face of Judge Koeltl’s observation in DNC that
seeking information, asking questions, and soliciting records are
fundamental aspects of journalism and their curtailment certainly
implicates First Amendment interests.250
The final way in which the Seventh Circuit sought to distinguish
244. Dahlstrom, 777 F.3d at 951.
245. Fla. Star, 491 U.S. at 536.
246. Id. The Court in Florida Star noted that the first step should be for the government to secure
the privacy of records, not to punish those who happen to obtain them. “Where information is
entrusted to the government, a less drastic means than punishing truthful publication almost always
exists for guarding against the dissemination of private facts.” Id. at 534. It made a similar point in
Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia. 435 U.S. 829, 841 & n.12 (1978) (noting that the State
could have done more to protect the confidentiality of its proceedings).
247. Dahlstrom, 777 F.3d at 952.
248. See Jean v. Mass. State Police, 492 F.3d 24 (1st Cir. 2007); Boehner III, 484 F.3d 573 (D.C.
Cir. 2007); Democratic Nat’l Comm. (DNC) v. Russian Fed’n, 392 F. Supp. 3d 410 (S.D.N.Y. 2019).
249. Fla. Star, 491 U.S. at 536 (“[D]epriving protection to those who rely on the government’s
implied representations of the lawfulness of dissemination, would force upon the media the onerous
obligation of sifting through government press releases, reports, and pronouncements to prune out
material arguably unlawful for publication.”).
250. DNC, 392 F. Supp. 3d at 436.
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Dahlstrom from Florida Star was by emphasizing the differences in the
underlying statute. The DPPA specifically authorizes penalties for both
“obtaining” and “disclosing” private information from motor vehicle
records.251 The statute in Florida Star, however, focused solely on
disclosures of personal information. Similarly, the wiretap laws in
Bartnicki only prohibited disclosures and uses of illegally intercepted
communications. After ruling for the defendant in Florida Star, the
Supreme Court reserved the question of whether a different outcome
might have been warranted had the statute specifically proscribed the
obtaining of the name of the rape victim. “Even assuming the Constitution
permitted a State to proscribe receipt of information,” the Court noted,
“Florida has not taken this step.”252 The Court acknowledged this issue in
Bartnicki but did not have a reason to answer it, so the Court left the matter
open once again.253
The Seventh Circuit responded by not only assuming that a statutory
prohibition on possession necessarily precluded Bartnicki protection
under prong two but by using the most narrow and literal approach
possible. The Sun-Times reporters argued that their pursuit of truthful,
newsworthy information held by a government agency is a routine
journalistic practice, and probably not what the legislature had in mind
when it drafted the law. Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit wrote, the
Sun-Times “cannot escape the fact that it acquired that truthful
information unlawfully.”254 It went still further, adding that the statute’s
prohibition on obtaining information did not implicate any First
Amendment interests and so was only subject to rational-basis scrutiny.255
After the Seventh Circuit remanded Dahlstrom, the District Court
explored more fully the role of the records custodians in the Secretary of
251. 18 U.S.C. § 2722(a) (“It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to obtain or disclose
personal information, from a motor vehicle record . . . .”).
252. Fla. Star, 491 U.S. at 536 (emphasis in original); see also Boehner III, 484 F.3d at 585
(Sentelle, J., dissenting) (“[T]he otherwise-lawful receipt of unlawfully obtained information remains
in itself lawful, even where the receiver knows or has reason to know that the source has obtained the
information unlawfully.”).
253. In effect the Court in Bartnicki added prong two as an acknowledgement of this open question
rather than as an attempt to answer it. The Court essentially said that at least where the information
was lawfully obtained—like it was in Bartnicki, because there was no statutory prohibition on
receiving the stolen communications—then publishers can disclose that information when it addresses
matters of public concern. It did not hold that unlawful receipt of information would necessarily
preclude protection. In that sense, prong two is not a mandatory condition that lower courts must
follow, but simply an acknowledgement of the facts in front of the Court and the possibility that its
analysis might be different in other circumstances.
254. Dahlstrom v. Sun-Times Media, LLC, 777 F.3d 937, 951 (7th Cir. 2015) (emphasis
in original).
255. Id. at 949.
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State’s office, acknowledging what the Seventh Circuit ignored: that those
officials violated the DPPA and that the journalists only obtained the
records as a result of that violation. Nevertheless, the district court held—
without any reference to Florida Star or Bartnicki—that the violation by
the Secretary of State officials “does not immunize the Sun-Times from
liability” because “an initial violation by one party does not negate
subsequent violations by another.”256 But this is precisely the opposite of
what the Supreme Court held in Florida Star when it made clear that
where the government itself provides information, it is fair to assume that
it “had, but failed to utilize, far more limited means of guarding against
dissemination” than imposing liability on a publisher of
that information.257
The only difference between Dahlstrom and Florida Star was the
inclusion of the word “obtain” in the DPPA.258 And if Florida Star and
Bartnicki protection can be defeated by simply including statutory
language prohibiting receipt of information, and that language is only
subject to rational-basis scrutiny, it is an extraordinary loophole.
Legislatures could easily exploit Dahlstrom by making any unauthorized
receipt of government information a crime, which would gut Bartnicki
while giving no sanctuary to journalists who receive leaked information
from whistleblowers and others. The Seventh Circuit’s approach
essentially treats information as contraband, allowing the government to
criminalize its mere possession, and inviting legislatures to skirt Bartnicki
by adding “obtain” and “possess” prohibitions to every government
records law.
This has major implications for people like Julian Assange, and for
journalists covering national security issues, because some laws like the
Espionage Act arguably prohibit the possession of classified or other
sensitive information.259 As a circuit court decision, Dahlstrom is
256. Dahlstrom v. Sun-Times Media, LLC, 346 F. Supp. 3d 1162, 1168 (N.D. Ill. 2018).
257. Fla. Star, 491 U. S. at 538. The Court added that once the government releases information
“reliance must rest upon the judgment of those who decide what to publish or broadcast.” Id. This
principle was also followed in one case applying Bartnicki, Palm Beach Newspapers, LLC v. State.
183 So. 3d 480 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016) (holding that a newspaper did not receive information
unlawfully when it was supplied by the government).
258. See 18 U.S.C. § 2722(a).
259. 18 U.S.C. § 793(e). This section prohibits unauthorized possessors of classified national
security information—which arguably could include journalists to whom such information has been
leaked—from communicating or retaining that information. Id. For a thorough analysis of how this
provision could apply against the press, see Stephen I. Vladeck, Inchoate Liability and the Espionage
Act: The Statutory Framework and the Freedom of the Press, 1 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 219 (2007).
Vladeck notes that in United States v. Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d 602 (E.D. Va. 2006), the court upheld
the conviction of third parties (albeit non-journalists) for conspiring to violate § 793(e). Vladeck,
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especially important, even though among the post-Bartnicki cases it
largely stands alone. No other cases have turned on the presence or
absence of this kind of statutory language. Nevertheless, because the
Supreme Court reserved the question in several cases, and because a
circuit court has now supplied an answer, it could have a malignant effect.
It does not help that the only other circuit court cases touching on the
prong two notion of unlawful acquisition—Boehner II and Boehner III—
introduced their own complications. In Boehner II, the D.C. Circuit
largely conflated prong one and prong two by treating McDermott’s
receipt of the intercepted phone call as unlawful because he knew the
information was illegally intercepted and had personal interaction with the
Martins.260 In Boehner III, the full D.C. Circuit, by the narrowest margin,
abandoned that rationale and instead focused on Rep. McDermott’s
special obligation under House rules not to reveal confidential
communications received in his capacity as a member of the Ethics
Committee.261 Four of the nine Boehner III judges would have maintained
that McDermott’s receipt of the information was unlawful,262 but that
issue was left open because the court shifted its focus to McDermott’s
disclosure. In the end, the D.C. Circuit essentially treated McDermott as
a records custodian, akin to other government employees who are
prohibited from revealing private or sensitive government records to
which they have been entrusted. There are two problems with this. One is
that McDermott’s obligations were ethical, not legal.263 The other is that,
to the extent that McDermott had surrendered some of his freedom to
communicate by virtue of his responsibilities as a member of the
committee, the analysis of his rights under Bartnicki was misplaced.
With regard to the first point, McDermott did not violate a criminal
law, his actions were not tortious, and he did not break an enforceable
supra, at 224. The court concluded that “the government can punish those outside of the government
for the unauthorized receipt and deliberate retransmission of information relating to the national
defense.” Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d at 637 (emphasis added).
260. Boehner II, 441 F.3d 1010, 1016 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
261. Boehner III, 484 F.3d 573, 581 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“When Representative McDermott became
a member of the Ethics Committee, he voluntarily accepted a duty of confidentiality that covered his
receipt and handling of the Martins’ illegal recording. He therefore had no First Amendment right to
disclose the tape to the media.”). This theory was first addressed in the immediately previous district
court opinion, but that court reached a different conclusion. Boehner v. McDermott, 332 F. Supp. 2d
149, 163 (D.D.C. 2004) (“[W]hile it is clear that McDermott received the information from the
Martins in his official political capacity, the Court does not find that he was under an independent
preexisting duty greater than that required of any citizen.”).
262. Boehner III, 484 F.3d at 577 n.1.
263. It is not even clear, as Judge Sentelle pointed out in his dissent, that McDermott violated House
rules. The House report on the matter found only that McDermott’s actions were “inconsistent with
the spirit of the applicable rules.” Id. at 590 (Sentelle, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted).
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contract. The penalties he was subject to were institutional sanctions like
peer censure and the like. He was not subject to any court-imposed or
other external sanction. By framing McDermott’s ethical duty as a legal
obligation and identifying no limiting conditions, the D.C. Circuit
endorsed a boundary-less exception to Bartnicki. Of course, there are
situations in which people voluntarily relinquish some of their First
Amendment rights and are bound by a superseding obligation of
non-disclosure.264 But if that exception is triggered by ethical duties rather
than statutory or contractual requirements, it is an arbitrary standard.
None of this would have mattered if not for the second problem, which
is that the court’s opinion initially presents the case as lying entirely
outside of the Bartnicki framework (“we shall assume arguendo,” the
court wrote, “that Representative McDermott lawfully obtained the tape
from the Martins”265) but never fully untethered it because it continued to
tie McDermott’s liability back to the illegal actions of the Martins. Judge
Griffith’s concurring opinion reflected the same error. He noted, correctly,
that the “the Court . . . need not reach the Bartnicki issue to resolve the
matter before us,”266 but concluded that because McDermott’s disclosures
were not protected by the First Amendment, he had no defense against the
wiretap claims stemming from the illegal acquisition.
The court noted that there are many situations in which people are
prohibited by law, or as a condition of their employment, from disclosing
sensitive information, and that punishments in those situations do not
necessarily violate the First Amendment.267 This is true and would have
been the case if McDermott had been punished by the House of
Representatives; he might not have had a First Amendment defense

264. Indeed, this was true in at least one other case applying Bartnicki. See Council on Am.-Islamic
Rels. Action Network, Inc. v. Gaubatz, 793 F. Supp. 2d 311 (D.D.C. 2011) (holding intern at a private
organization did not have First Amendment right to disclose organization’s private but newsworthy
records where doing so violated the parties’ confidentiality agreement); see also Snepp v. United
States, 444 U.S. 507, 509 n.3 (1980) (holding that former CIA agent whose employment contract
prohibited disclosure of classified information, even post-employment, did not have a First
Amendment right to disclose that information).
265. Boehner III, 484 F.3d at 577.
266. Id. at 581 (Griffith, J., concurring).
267. The court lists examples of laws that impose limits on disclosure by custodians or possessors
of certain information, including the Espionage Act, the Privacy Act and the Intelligence Identities
Protection Act. Id. at 578 (majority opinion). And it notes that certain government employees—those
working for the Internal Revenue Service or the Social Security Administration—are obligated to
maintain the confidentiality of certain records. Id. None of those examples are on point, however,
because none involve holding the discloser of those records liable for the antecedent illegal acts of
third parties. Id.
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against institutionally imposed sanctions.268 But the fact that he had
voluntarily surrendered some of his First Amendment rights to disclose
information placed in his custody is not a reason to tie his culpability back
to the illegal interception by the Martins. By the D.C. Circuit’s own
admission, McDermott met all of the conditions of Bartnicki, yet the court
still found him liable. Whether it intended to or not, then, and despite
Judge Griffith’s assertions to the contrary, the court carved out a vague
exception within the Bartnicki framework rather than a clear exception
to it.
Unfortunately, other lower court rulings have not offered much
additional guidance about what constitutes illegal acquisition in the prong
two sense, although one court held that the receipt of documents that a
defendant knew were under judicial seal constituted unlawful
acquisition.269 Prong two scenarios do not arise very often because it is
rare for statutes to explicitly prohibit the receipt or possession of
information. Still, courts ought to consider abandoning this criterion
altogether and strike down as inconsistent with the First Amendment any
proscription on the mere possession of information, at least where that
information relates to a matter of public significance, and the possessor
believed this to be the case prior to taking possession. This would still
leave open the possibility of liability for those who actively participate in
the illegal procurement of the information and those who knowingly
receive illegally acquired information without any expectation that it
contained information of public concern.270 It would also resolve the
paradoxical situation where someone is free to publish what they are
prohibited from possessing, as if the former is possible without the latter.
There is one final question related to prong two that the courts have not
resolved and that the Supreme Court has repeatedly left open, including
in Bartnicki: “[W]hether, in cases where information has been acquired
unlawfully by a newspaper or by a source, government may ever punish

268. Compare id., with Baumann v. District of Columbia, 987 F. Supp. 2d 68 (2013) (denying
Bartnicki protection to government employee disciplined for misconduct after disclosing confidential
radio communications between emergency response personnel).
269. Lowe v. Hearst Commc’ns., Inc., 403 F. Supp. 2d 568, 576 (W.D. Tex. 2005) (“If . . . Hearst
obtained the sealed documents in contravention of the sealing order and published them, it has done
so ‘illegally’ in the sense that it violated a lawful court order of which it had notice.”), superseded,
414 F. Supp. 2d 669 (W.D. Tex. 2006).
270. So, someone offered stolen credit card information or an illegally recorded sex tape would not
be able to claim the protection, but those with a good faith and well-founded belief that the offered
information contained material of public significance would be immune from liability for merely
possessing it.
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not only the unlawful acquisition, but the ensuing publication as well.”271
Aside from noting the strong presumption against the constitutionality of
restraints on publishing newsworthy information,272 the Court offered
little insight. The question also needs some parsing because a court might
answer the question differently depending on whether they interpret the
phrase “unlawful acquisition” to mean primary participation under prong
one, secondary participation under prong one, or merely the unsolicited
but illegal receipt or possession of information under prong two.
The Seventh Circuit purported to enter this “uncharted territory”273 in
Dahlstrom, noting that the question raised by the Court about restrictions
on publishing information “acquired unlawfully by a newspaper” was
“still open.”274 The Seventh Circuit’s answer was incomplete, however,
because it found that the DPPA was a reasonable limitation on the right to
publish where there is no “intervening illegal actor” and the “acquirer and
the publisher are one and the same.”275 The court acknowledged that the
outcome might have been different if a third party had acquired the
information illegally and transmitted it to the Sun-Times, but the court
concluded that was not the case, and so the situation was not analogous to
Bartnicki.276 In reaching this conclusion, however, the court completely
ignored the actions of the records custodians at the office of the Secretary
of State, whose disclosure of the information violated the DPPA. Other
courts should take note of this factual oversight when interpreting and
applying Dahlstrom; the Seventh Circuit’s conclusion is delegitimized by
its own mischaracterization of the facts and by its inconsistency with the
rulings in both Florida Star and Bartnicki. Nevertheless, the Seventh
Circuit is at least one influential court that has concluded that there is no
constitutional problem with imposing limits on the publication of
newsworthy information, at least where the defendant was a primary
participant in illegally procuring the information. It remains to be seen if
other courts will concur or whether they will distinguish situations in
which the defendant was a secondary participant or where they merely
271. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 528 (2001) (emphasis in original) (quoting Fla. Star v.
B.J.F, 491 U.S. 524, 535 n.8 (1989)) (noting that the same question was also reserved by the court in
Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 837 (1978), after being initially raised by
the Court in N.Y. Times Co. v. United States (Pentagon Papers), 403 U.S. 713 (1971)).
272. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 527 (emphasis in original) (quoting Smith v. Daily Mail Pub’g Co., 443
U.S. 97, 102 (1979)).
273. Dahlstrom v. Sun-Times Media, LLC, 777 F.3d 937, 951–52 (7th Cir. 2015).
274. Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 528).
275. Id. at 952. In those situations, the court noted, punishing disclosure is more likely to deter
illegal acquisition, unlike in situations like Bartnicki where the publisher of the information was not
the party who illegally intercepted it. Id.
276. Id.

Ugland & Mazzeo (Do Not Delete)

2021]

HACKS, LEAKS, AND DATA DUMPS

3/22/2021 11:58 AM

183

received the illegally acquired information from a third party.
There is another approach that courts should consider, which is to sever
illegal acquisition from publication to more precisely target the harms
caused by each while not unduly restraining the flow of newsworthy
information. Courts could simply treat procurement and publication as
discrete acts redressable through discrete remedies. This is essentially
what the Fourth Circuit did in a pre-Bartnicki case, Food Lion, Inc. v.
Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.277 In that case, reporters lied to get hired at Food
Lion grocery stores where they documented unsanitary food handling
practices while on the job using hidden cameras and microphones.278 The
resulting broadcast report caused Food Lion stock to plummet, and the
company sued under a number of tort theories.279 The Fourth Circuit held
that while the reporters and their parent organization could be held liable
for torts they committed in their pursuit of the story (e.g., trespass, breach
of the duty of loyalty), any damages awarded had to be tied directly to the
harms caused by those breaches, not those resulting from the
subsequent broadcast.280
Although the Supreme Court has not addressed this issue directly, its
rulings in Cohen and Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell281 provided the
doctrinal foundation for Food Lion.282 In addition, the Food Lion principle
(disentangling newsgathering-related damages from publication-related
damages283) has been widely embraced by other courts, including by the
First and Sixth Circuits,284 and it is consistent with other Supreme Court
277. 194 F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 1999).
278. Id. at 510–11.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 523–24. Food Lion was still free to sue for defamation for any harms caused by the
broadcast—a claim they never pursued, perhaps because they would not have been able to prove that
the report was materially false.
281. 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
282. In Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment does not
immunize journalists from liability for torts they commit in their pursuit of news. 501 U.S. 663 (1991).
Nevertheless, the Court previously made clear in Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell that plaintiffs
cannot skirt First Amendment requirements by seeking reputation-based damages for
non-reputation-based torts. 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
283. Food Lion, 194 F.3d at 522 (“What Food Lion sought to do, then, was to recover
defamation-type damages under non-reputational tort claims, without satisfying the stricter (First
Amendment) standards of a defamation claim. We believe that such an end-run around First
Amendment strictures is foreclosed by Hustler.”).
284. Both courts concluded that journalist-defendants were not protected by the First Amendment
against pecuniary harms caused by their misrepresentations to sources but that damages could not be
based on the journalists’ subsequent reporting. Veilleux v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 206 F.3d 92 (1st Cir.
2000); W.D.I.A. Corp. v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 34 F. Supp. 2d 612 (S.D. Ohio 1998), aff’d, 202 F.3d
271 (6th Cir. 2000) (per curiam). Not all courts have followed the Food Lion model, however. In two
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cases decoupling harmful acts from depictions of those acts.285 This
approach is also compatible with Supreme Court precedent (given that the
Court has repeatedly reserved the question) and with Bartnicki itself,
which is often misread as foreclosing First Amendment protection for
those who unlawfully acquire information when in fact the Court
approached it from the opposite direction, acknowledging the unchanged
presence of First Amendment protection when information is “obtained
lawfully.”286 The Bartnicki Court explicitly refused to identify a ceiling of
protection, mindful of its longstanding reluctance to offer a final answer
about “whether truthful publication may ever be punished consistent with
the First Amendment.”287
In the Julian Assange case, untying acquisition and publication would
mean that the government could still pursue charges under the Espionage
Act by seeking to prove that Assange conspired with Manning to access
classified records. They could also pursue separate charges or seek
injunctions, focusing on the publication of the records. But courts should
reject the government’s attempts to criminalize the mere possession of
records that are of public significance or attempts to vitiate First
Amendment protection for publication by pointing to the technical
illegality of the defendants’ prior possession or receipt of that information.
Those approaches, endorsed in one form or another by the courts in
Quigley, Boehner II and Dahlstrom, and by the plaintiffs in the Cockrum
and DNC cases, suppose an inextricable connection between illegal actors
and third-party publishers and turn prong two into a technical exception
that can too easily be exploited to suppress the circulation of newsworthy
information. On the latter point, Donald Trump’s threatened tax-records
lawsuit against The New York Times provides an illustration. The Times
is clearly protected by Bartnicki because it obtained the records from a
third party, and the records are clearly newsworthy.288 But a simple
amendment by Congress outlawing the obtaining of tax records by
California cases, Turnbull v. American Broadcasting Co., No. CV 03-3554 SJO, 2004 WL 2924590
(C.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2004) and Sanders v. American Broadcasting Co., No. B094245, 1999 WL
1458129 (Cal. App. Dec. 15, 1999), the courts held that damages for harms caused by non-consensual
video recordings could be based on both the recording itself and the subsequent broadcast of
the video.
285. See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010) (recognizing the legitimacy of laws
against animal cruelty but striking down application of law that punished depictions of such cruelty).
For a similar example from a different court and context, see Anderson v. Blake, No. Civ-05-0729HE, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25654 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 21, 2005) (news organization could not be liable
for intrusion for broadcasting part of a recording of a rape where organization was not involved in
making the recording).
286. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 525 (2001).
287. Id. at 529.
288. See Buettner et al., supra note 229.
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non-custodians would be constitutional under Dahlstrom and would
subject the Times to criminal liability for publishing information of clear
public concern. That obstacle also looms large for Assange because the
Espionage Act proscribes possession of classified documents relating to
national security.289
A cleaner and less hazardous approach would be for courts to more
clearly disentangle procurement, receipt, and publication. They should
close the Dahlstrom loophole that allows governments to criminalize the
mere receipt of newsworthy information, particularly when that
information is supplied by the government itself.290 And courts should
abandon the Boehner III exception that treats defendants’ duties of
non-disclosure (even some duties that are not legally enforceable) as
relevant in assessing liability for illegal procurement.
C.

Bartnicki Prong Three: Public Concern

The third prerequisite for invoking Bartnicki protection is that
information addresses a matter of “public concern.”291 This is a familiar
but malleable term used by the courts in a number of contexts and
sometimes expressed as “public interest,” “public issue,” “public
significance,” or “newsworthiness.” The Supreme Court has long
recognized292 the distinction between private people and issues, on one
hand, and public people and issues on the other, giving more expansive
protection to speech about the latter in the adjudication of defamation
claims,293 in assessing the constitutionality of restrictions on
public-employee speech,294 and in the pre-Bartnicki line of cases
involving the disclosure of non-public information.295
289. See supra note 259.
290. As Justice Stewart noted in Pentagon Papers, “[t]he responsibility must be where the power
is.” N.Y. Times Co. v. United States (Pentagon Papers), 403 U.S. 713, 729–30 (1971) (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
291. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 525.
292. The First Amendment “embraces at the least the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully all
matters of public concern without previous restraint or fear of subsequent punishment.” Thornhill v.
Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101–02 (1940).
293. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 348 (1974) (permitting states to establish
less onerous standards of proof in libel cases brought by private people than those applying to public
people); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 44 (1971) (extending protection “to all
discussion and communication involving matters of public or general concern”); N.Y. Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270–71 (1964) (recognizing the “profound national commitment to the
principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open”).
294. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983) (holding that public employee could be fired
without violating the First Amendment where the triggering speech involved private, internal
workplace issues, not “a matter of public concern”).
295. See supra text accompanying notes 64–67.
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Prior to Bartnicki, lower courts had not given much shape to the
concept of public concern but had embraced expansive conceptions of
“newsworthiness,” finding that it encompassed just about everything short
of “morbid and sensational prying into private lives.”296 The Supreme
Court, which has not defined newsworthiness, offered a seemingly
narrower definition of public concern in Connick v. Myers,297 saying that
whether speech addresses matters of public concern must be determined
by its “content, form, and context”298 but that it generally encompasses
material “relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the
community.”299 A few years after Bartnicki, the Court added in City of
San Diego v. Roe300 that “public concern is something that is a subject of
legitimate news interest; that is, a subject of general interest and of value
and concern to the public.”301 In 2011, the Court broached the definitional
question again in Snyder v. Phelps302 but largely reiterated the language
from Connick and Roe.303
The Supreme Court did not address these definitional questions in
Bartnicki, but it is clear that Justice Stevens had in mind an expansive
notion of public concern. His opinion only mentioned disclosures of
“trade secrets, domestic gossip or other information of purely private
concern”304 as being potentially305 unprotected. He also at one point used
the term “newsworthy” in conjunction with “public concern,” stating that
the content of the Kane-Bartnicki call involved matters of public concern,
and if the conversation had occurred in public, it would have been
considered newsworthy.306 Perhaps most important was Stevens’s
characterization of the salient facts in Bartnicki. Stevens focused on the
newsworthiness of the broader context of the call—the battle between the
296. Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 1975) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
652F (AM. L. INST., Tentative Draft No. 13, 1967)). Newsworthiness is a defense to civil
claims for public disclosure of private facts and has been defined so broadly in that context that one
media law scholar suggested that the defense had “swallow[ed]” the tort. Harry Kalven, Jr., Privacy
in Tort Law—Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 326, 336 (1966).
297. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
298. Id. at 147.
299. Id. at 146.
300. 543 U.S. 77 (2004).
301. Id. at 83–84.
302. 562 U.S. 443 (2011).
303. Id. at 453.
304. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 533 (2001).
305. Stevens did not rule out protection for speech on those subjects but merely reserved the
question. Id. Some courts have acknowledged this uncertainty, e.g., Quigley v. Rosenthal, 327 F.3d
1044, 1067–68 (10th Cir. 2003), but none has recognized protection for private information in
Bartnicki situations.
306. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 525.
OF TORTS §
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union and the school district—which he described in the final paragraph
of his opinion as “unquestionably a matter of public concern,” adding that
“respondents were clearly engaged in debate about that concern.”307
Stevens put no emphasis on Kane’s “blow off their front
porches” comment.308
Breyer, on the other hand, began his opinion by highlighting the
porches comment, which he clearly viewed as more than rhetorical
hyperbole, writing that the “threat of potential physical harm to others”
made the recording a matter of “unusual public concern.” 309 Because
Breyer’s concurrence emphasized the threat rather than the broader
subject-matter of the conversation,310 and because he and Justice
O’Connor provided the crucial votes for the defendants,311 lower courts
were left with some uncertainty about where to place the emphasis under
prong three.
In terms of terminology, lower courts applying Bartnicki have mirrored
the Court’s treatment of “public concern,” “public interest,” and
“newsworthiness” as synonymous or parallel concepts and often use them
interchangeably within the same opinion. Some courts have explored the
definitional issues in more detail,312 some have avoided the issue
altogether,313 and others have treated either the public314 or private315
nature of the information as self-evident. The types of material that courts
applying Bartnicki have found to be of public concern include video of
police executing a search warrant at a private residence,316 details of an
307. Id. at 535.
308. Stevens mentions Kane’s comment, but as part of the facts of the case, not as a determinative
factor in assessing the newsworthiness of the call. Id. at 518–19.
309. Id. at 536 (Breyer, J., concurring).
310. Breyer also highlighted the public-figure status of the participants. Id. at 539.
311. Justice O’Connor joined the Breyer concurrence, creating a six-vote majority in favor of
the defendants.
312. See Cockrum v. Donald J. Trump for President, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 3d 652, 658–59 (E.D. Va.
2019); Lowe v. Hearst Commc’ns, Inc., 403 F. Supp. 2d 568, 572–73 (W.D. Tex. 2005), superseded,
414 F. Supp. 2d 669 (W.D. Tex. 2006).
313. Neither the district court in Boehner v. McDermott, 332 F. Supp. 2d 149 (D.D.C. 2004) nor
the D.C. Circuit in Boehner II or Boehner III addressed the issue of public concern. Indeed, in Boehner
II the court only acknowledged prong three of Bartnicki in a footnote and then noted that the Supreme
Court had previously warned about the difficulty of judges determining what issues are of public
concern. Boehner II, 441 F.3d 1010, 1014 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
418 U.S. 323, 346 (1974)).
314. See, e.g., Palm Beach Newspapers, LLC v. State, 183 So. 3d 480, 482–83 (2016) (declaring
that information about prosecutors’ collaboration with a jailhouse “snitch” was “clearly one of
public concern”).
315. See, e.g., Trans Union Corp. v. FTC, 267 F.3d 1138 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (rejecting applicability
of Bartnicki to disclosure of private credit report information).
316. Jean v. Mass. State Police, 492 F.3d 24 (1st Cir. 2007).
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illegal blackmail scheme,317 information about evidence in an upcoming
murder trial,318 and information relating to the validity of a police
lineup.319 Information that courts have found to not be of public concern
include false speech,320 defamatory speech,321 non-consensual sexual
images (“revenge porn”),322 information about the paternity of a child
accessed from a private cell phone,323 and cell phone conversations in
which a participant made a threat of violence that the court ultimately
viewed as not credible.324
A few courts added their own peculiar conditions. In Quigley, the Tenth
Circuit distinguished Bartnicki in part because the Aronsons’ lawyers “did
not accurately portray the contents of the Quigleys’ recorded telephone
conversations.”325 False information is not newsworthy, of course, but the
court did not offer any insight about the point at which these reporting
errors might destroy Bartnicki protection.
Similarly, the Michigan Supreme Court held that the defendants could
not rely on Bartnicki because they were not “members of the press” and
because they distributed illegally recorded video as an extra feature on a
commercially distributed DVD.326 The court in Bowens made no effort to
317. Lowe v. Hearst Commc’ns, Inc., 403 F. Supp. 2d 568 (W.D. Tex. 2005), superseded, 414 F.
Supp. 2d 669 (W.D. Tex. 2006).
318. Palm Beach, 183 So. 3d 480.
319. Dahlstrom v. Sun-Times Media, LLC, 777 F.3d 937 (7th Cir. 2015).
320. Quigley v. Rosenthal, 327 F.3d 1044 (10th Cir. 2003).
321. State v. Baron, 2009 WI 58, 318 Wis. 2d 60, 769 N.W.2d 34.
322. State v. VanBuren, 2018 VT 95, 210 Vt. 293, 214 A.3d 791.
323. In re Marriage of Evilsizor & Sweeney, 189 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1 (Cal. 2015). The defendant
husband discovered text messages on the phone of his plaintiff wife indicating that she had received
fertility treatments, leading the husband to suspect he might not be the father of their child. The court
noted that the defendant had “not identified any public concern in [his wife’s] text messages and other
information that he surreptitiously took from her phones,” and that the information was of “purely
private concern” and therefore outside the scope of Bartnicki. Id. at 1428 (quoting Bartnicki v.
Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 533 (2001)).
324. Wingrave v. Hebert, 2006-1240 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/9/07); 964 So. 2d 385. Although the court
expressed doubt about the credibility of the threat made by an intoxicated participant in a private
phone conversation, it treated this as a material question of fact to be assessed by the lower court on
remand. Id. at 11–13, 964 So. 2d at 392–93.
325. Quigley v. Rosenthal, 327 F.3d 1044, 1067 (10th Cir. 2003) (emphasis added). In Bartnicki,
the court noted:
[T]he defendants broadcast the recorded conversation and printed a transcript of the
conversation. Here, in contrast, the defendants merely used snippets of the Quigleys’
conversations in preparing the Aronsons’ civil complaint, and inaccurately portrayed those
comments as demonstrating the existence of an anti-Semitic campaign on the part of the Quigleys
against the Aronsons.
Id.
326. Bowens v. Ary, Inc., No. 282711, 2009 Mich. App. LEXIS 2000, at *21 (Mich. Ct. App.
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explain whom it considered to be “members of the press,”327 what works
fit within its exclusion of material distributed “for profit,”328 or how either
of these things affected the public’s interest in the material. 329 It proved
to be an aberrational case, however. No other court has conditioned
protection on the defendants’ journalistic credentials330 or on their
commercial interests in disclosure.
Another anomalous case was DVD Copy Control Ass’n v. Bunner,331 in
which the California Supreme Court held that the online distribution of
DVD decryption software did not relate to matters of public concern. This
type of functional speech does not contribute to the examination of public
issues, the court held, and furthermore it fit within the Bartnicki Court’s
implicit prong-three exception for trade secrets.332 This issue reemerged
more recently in DNC. The DNC alleged that the defendants violated the
DNC’s trade secrets by publishing its donor lists and fundraising
strategies.333 Judge Koeltl concluded that Bartnicki protection could not
be vanquished by simply labeling something a trade secret, and that the
Sept. 24, 2009), rev’d in part, 489 Mich. 851 (2011). The Michigan Supreme Court ultimately
dismissed the wiretap claim, finding that the plaintiffs did not have reasonable expectations of privacy
in the bustling backstage area of an arena. It did not address the Bartnicki criteria because it found no
basis for the claim in the first place. Id.
327. Id.
328. Id. One court suggested that media attention is an indicator of public concern. Wingrave,
2006-1240 at 11–13, 964 So. 2d at 391–92 (“However, we find Bartnicki distinguishable [because]
the record reflects that [the] telephone conversation was not regarding information reported in the
media.”).
329. Indeed, this case is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s notation in Bartnicki that the Court
drew “no distinction between the media respondents and Yocum.” Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514,
525 n.8 (2001).
330. For the most part, courts did not address the status or credentials of the defendants and treated
their baseline eligibility for Bartnicki protection as obvious or just addressed it in passing. See, e.g.,
Democratic Nat’l Comm. (DNC) v. Russian Fed’n, 392 F. Supp. 3d 410, 418 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (“[T]he
First Amendment prevents such liability in the same way it would preclude liability for press outlets
that publish materials of public interest . . . .” (emphasis added)). Judge Sentelle emphasized the
inconsequence of journalistic identity in Boehner II. 441 F.3d 1010, 1022 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (Sentelle,
J., dissenting) (“Lest someone draw a distinction between the First Amendment rights of the press
and the First Amendment speech rights of nonprofessional communicators, I would note that one of
the communicators in Bartnicki was himself a news commentator, and the Supreme Court placed no
reliance on that fact.”).
331. 75 P.3d 1 (Cal. 2003).
332. Id. at 86 (noting that the Court need not decide whether to protect “disclosures of trade secrets
or domestic gossip or other information of purely private concern” (emphasis in original) (quoting
Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 533)). One federal district court applying Bartnicki emphasized that “trade
secrets and commercial information” often needs to be treated with special sensitivity and can
justifiably be withheld from public records. In re Zyprexa Injunction, 474 F. Supp. 2d 385, 424
(E.D.N.Y. 2007). That part of the decision was addressed to the appropriateness of a court seal,
however, not specifically to the issue of public concern under Bartnicki.
333. DNC, 392 F. Supp. 3d at 436.
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information the DNC sought to shield involved matters of “paramount
public concern.”334 Whatever interest the DNC had in secrecy was
“dwarfed by the news-worthiness of the documents as [a] whole.”335
The Seventh Circuit in Dahlstrom took a perplexing approach to the
public concern issue and, in turn, left another mess for future courts. The
court conceded that the Sun-Times investigation examining the propriety
of a police line-up involving the Mayor’s nephew was a matter of public
concern,336 but concluded that the information the reporters obtained from
motor vehicle records was largely duplicative of information the reporters
had legally obtained from other sources and was therefore “of less
pressing public concern than the [information] in Bartnicki.”337 This
ignores the phrasing of Justice Stevens’s opinion, which focused on the
“subject matter of the conversation”338—not particular details—as the
basis for gauging the public interest. Also, as the court points out, the
material obtained from the records—the height, weight, hair color, and
eye color of the officers who participated in the lineup—were readily
observable. This does more to undermine the legitimacy of the
government’s concealment of these records than to refute the utility of the
information for the reporters. (Under the Seventh Circuit’s logic, the
government could criminalize the disclosure of a government record
indicating that the sun is yellow.) Even if the DPAA records were less
essential than the information at issue in Bartnicki, it still clearly related
to a matter of public interest. Meanwhile, as the court effectively
acknowledges, there is no basis for treating the officers’ conspicuous
physical characteristics as private.
Courts should fix this by simply striking down as unconstitutional any
legislative or administrative provision that criminalizes the possession of,
or otherwise suppresses, information that is plainly observable and ipso
facto not private. Indeed, one federal district court in 2003, citing
Bartnicki, did just that, suggesting that this type of information is not
constitutionally concealable in the first place339—something the Seventh
334. Id. at 437.
335. Id. Judge Koeltl concluded that the publication of this information “allowed the American
electorate to look behind the curtain of one of the two major political parties in the United States
during a presidential election.” Id.
336. Dahlstrom v. Sun-Times Media, LLC, 777 F.3d 937, 953 (7th Cir. 2015).
337. Id.
338. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 525 (2001).
339. In Sheehan v. Gregoire, the court struck down parts of a state statute that criminalized the
unauthorized publication of “personal identifying information”—including residential addresses,
phone numbers and birth dates. 272 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 1142 (W.D. Wash. 2003). “Defendants cite no
authority,” the court held, “for the proposition that truthful lawfully-obtained, publicly-available
personal identifying information constitutes a mode of constitutionally proscribable speech.” Id.
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Circuit seems not to have considered.340
Many of the courts applying Bartnicki, no doubt wary of making
categorical pronouncements, have focused on the facts of the cases before
them and the ways in which those facts might be distinguishable from or
analogized to the facts of Bartnicki. Unfortunately, some courts have
seized on the most sensational aspect of Bartnicki—Kane’s “blow off
their front porches” comment341—using that as the benchmark for “public
concern,” effectively narrowing Bartnicki’s scope. Although some courts,
like the First Circuit in Jean, focused its attention on Stevens’s opinion
and pointed to the collective bargaining negotiations in Bartnicki as the
basis for finding the Kane-Bartnicki phone call to be a matter of public
concern,342 other courts, like the Seventh Circuit in Dahlstrom, largely
ignored Stevens’s opinion and instead cited Breyer’s concurring opinion,
concluding that the material at issue in Dahlstrom was “of less pressing
public concern than the threats of physical violence in Bartnicki.”343
Even for judges who emphasize Breyer’s concurrence, it is a
misreading of Bartnicki to conclude that threats of violence are a
minimum threshold for establishing that an issue is of public concern. The
analogy only works in one direction. It is certainly fair to conclude that
information that is at least as consequential as the “porches” threat would
clearly be of public concern and would satisfy the four justices signing
Stevens’s opinion and the two who signed Breyer’s concurrence. It would
not be fair to take from Bartnicki, however, that anything falling below
that standard is not of public concern. Breyer was not marking outer
boundaries but merely acknowledging the unusual circumstances of the
case.344 Although he warned that Stevens’s opinion should not be read as
establishing an all-encompassing public interest exception to privacy
laws,345 courts should not read Breyer’s concurrence as rejecting the
legitimacy of the public’s interest in anything less consequential than what
340. Relatedly, courts should not accept the designation of a record as “private” without
considering its actual content. The DPAA records obtained in Dahlstrom were only private in the
categorical sense. Similarly, in the dispute between ESPN’s Adam Schefter and NFL player Jason
Pierre-Paul, Schefter clearly disclosed a record that had been categorized as private. But the facts
revealed—that Pierre-Paul had part of his hand amputated—were not truly private; his hand was
plainly observable and so his injury would never remain a secret.
341. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 519.
342. Jean v. Mass. State Police, 492 F.3d 24, 30 (1st Cir. 2007) (concluding that the “warrantless
and potentially unlawful search of a private residence” at issue was at least as worthy of public
scrutiny as the union battle in Bartnicki).
343. Dahlstrom v. Sun-Times Media, LLC, 777 F.3d 937, 953 (7th Cir. 2015) (emphasis added)
(citing Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 536 (Breyer, J., concurring)) (“noting that the intercepted conversation
presented a ‘matter of unusual public concern’”).
344. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 540 (Breyer, J., concurring).
345. Id.
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Breyer perceived to be an immediate and credible threat of violence.
Nevertheless, this divide persists and is evidenced by the approaches
of the two federal district courts in the DNC hacking cases. In DNC, Judge
Koeltl concluded that, collectively, the hacked emails addressed matters
of public concern because they shed light on the behind-the-scenes
operations of a major-party presidential campaign.346 In Cockrum,
however, Judge Hudson held that Bartnicki is “distinguishable from the
immediate case” in part because “the information at issue in Bartnicki
pertained to a contemplated act of violence clearly a matter of public
concern”347 and that the evidence in Cockrum was insufficient to
demonstrate a similarly weighty interest in the DNC emails.348
This division among judges about whether “public concern” should be
calculated in an atomized way, looking at the newsworthiness of
particular pieces of information, or in a more holistic way, focusing on the
broader context of the full communication, is unresolved but particularly
salient is some of the newer cases, especially those involving large caches
of data. In Cockrum, Judge Hudson seemed generally persuaded by the
plaintiffs’ argument that “the First Amendment does not protect
[publication of] large amounts of private information with some isolated
facts of public concern,”349 while in DNC, Judge Koeltl expressed
apprehension about the opposite problem—singling out small pieces of
private information to trump “the newsworthiness of the documents as [a]
whole.”350 This is clearly an issue that courts need to resolve and one that
is particularly complicated in cases involving classified records, like those
at the center of the Assange prosecution, where the classification is itself
a simultaneous marker of both the sensitivity and newsworthiness of
the information.
Going forward, courts should embrace Stevens’s contextual approach
to assessing the public interest in communication, at least when applying
Bartnicki itself.351 Where published information includes some
particularly invasive revelations, aggrieved plaintiffs can still file separate
civil claims targeting that published content, subject to the normal
346. Democratic Nat’l Comm. (DNC) v. Russian Fed’n, 392 F. Supp. 3d 410, 437 (S.D.N.Y. 2019).
347. Cockrum v. Donald J. Trump for President, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 3d 652, 657 (E.D. Va. 2019);
see also, e.g., Commonwealth v. F.W., 986 N.E.2d 868, 873 (Mass. 2013) (“Here, we are not
concerned with a public threat . . . .”).
348. Cockrum, 365 F. Supp. 3d at 658–59. Judge Hudson ultimately concluded that the release of
the hacked emails did “not warrant First Amendment protection.” Id. at 659.
349. Id. at 658.
350. DNC, 392 F. Supp. 3d at 437.
351. It is likely Justice Breyer was not marking a minimum threshold for protection but simply
highlighting the most striking aspect of the Kane-Bartnicki phone call, probably as a way of
simplifying the decision. In any case, there is no reason courts should assume more than that.
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exceptions and defenses that apply to those torts. In Bartnicki scenarios,
the question is essentially whether courts should circumscribe a
publisher’s freedoms because of an antecedent violation by someone
else—to link one actor to another. The indirectness of this, coupled with
what should be a strong First Amendment presumption in favor of
disclosing truthful, newsworthy information, augurs for a more capacious
understanding of public concern under prong three. In a subsequent,
publication-focused action, however—non-Bartnicki actions, so to
speak—where the attention is on the harm caused by the content itself
without regard to its provenance, a more targeted conception of public
concern might be easier to justify. In hacking or other scenarios in which
large databases or batches of illegally acquired information are involved,
recipients of that data should be able to publish it without facing liability
for the interception, provided the information collectively sheds light on
matters of public concern. However, publishers could still be liable, in a
subsequent action for, say, public disclosure of private facts, for discrete
revelations contained within the aggregate data.352 A better approach,
described more fully in the next section, would be to repeal or modify
Bartnicki
to
fully
disentangle
illegal
acquisition
and
subsequent publication.
IV. REPAIRING BARTNICKI: THE PATH FORWARD
The Court in Bartnicki had an opportunity to resolve the case by
leaning on its prior rulings and recognizing, as the Sixth Circuit did in a
pre-Bartnicki case, that “[n]o matter how inappropriate the
acquisition . . . the right to disseminate [newsworthy] information is what
the Constitution intended to protect.”353 Remedies existed then, and are
available today, to punish those who violate the law to procure
information and those whose publications cause harm. The Court
complicated matters by forging an unnecessary link between the two.
Breaking that link and decoupling procurement and publication would be
the most helpful next step. It would simplify matters both practically and
conceptually and would align the law with pre-Bartnicki precedent.

352. The normal defense of newsworthiness would certainly apply to these claims, although courts
should recognize that plaintiffs’ privacy interests are lower with workplace, and particularly
government, communications, and that, as a practical matter, there are times in which a private piece
of information is not readily severable from the newsworthy whole. See, e.g., McNamara v. Freedom
Newspapers, Inc., 802 S.W.2d 901 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991) (finding that a newspaper photographer’s
photo of a boy playing in a public soccer match was protected and newsworthy, despite the photo
inadvertently capturing the boys exposed genitals).
353. In re King World Prods., Inc., 898 F.2d 56, 59 (6th Cir. 1990).
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Reverse and Replace

Bartnicki was a necessary decision in that it addressed a question the
Court had left open almost exactly thirty years earlier in Pentagon Papers:
to what extent can those who knowingly receive newsworthy information,
illegally acquired or leaked by someone else, be subject to
post-publication liability without violating the First Amendment? The
Court’s answer to that question in Bartnicki was needlessly convoluted,
however. The Court should have simply affirmed the principle from Daily
Mail—when one “lawfully obtains truthful information about a matter of
public significance then state officials may not constitutionally punish
publication of the information, absent a need to further a state interest of
the highest order”354—and added that one does not unlawfully acquire
newsworthy information by requesting it or merely coming into
possession of it. Courts could express this even more affirmatively:
imposing civil or criminal penalties on those who request or possess
newsworthy information violates the First Amendment. This approach
preserves the free speech interests while disentangling the harms caused
by illegal procurement from harms caused by publication, bringing things
into alignment with the Food Lion principle.355
Decoupling procurement and publication would still allow those who
participate in illegal activity, as first links in the chain, to be criminally
charged, and it would leave open other remedies for aggrieved plaintiffs.
A person whose communications were illegally intercepted could still sue
the interceptor for intrusion or bring a suit under the wiretap laws.
Plaintiffs could also sue separately for disclosures of their private
communications under traditional tort theories, where applicable.356 Of
course, decoupling would make deterrence more challenging. The wiretap
laws at issue in Bartnicki punished the “use” and “disclosure” of
confidential communications in part to cut off incentives for
interception,357 and there is a risk that future hackers will be emboldened
by knowing that others have some latitude to publish the fruits of their
interceptions. But legislators can always augment penalties or bolster

354. 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979).
355. See supra text accompanying note 283.
356. For example, if a defendant mischaracterized or selectively edited the intercepted
communications in a way that left a false and defamatory impression of the plaintiff, the plaintiff
might be able to sustain a libel claim. If the disclosures involved deeply personal information the
revelation of which would be considered highly offensive, the plaintiff might be able to succeed on a
claim for public disclosure of private facts, although the defendant could defeat this claim by showing
that the information was newsworthy. See supra text accompany notes 277–280.
357. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(d)–(e).
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enforcement, as Justice Stevens noted in Bartnicki.358 Even in situations
in which a hacker is never identified or where the hacker is a foreign actor
unreachable by a civil suit, plaintiffs would still have recourse to sue for
content-related harms, as they do now. So, in situations like the 2014 hack
of Sony Pictures, which involved some of the company’s unreleased films
and developmental scripts,359 the company could sue those who shared its
copyrighted content online even without knowing the identity of the
original hackers. In situations like the 2010 dispute between Apple and
Gizmodo over Gizmodo’s reporting about an unreleased iPhone
prototype, Apple could at least theoretically sue Gizmodo and others for
publishing its trade secrets.360 And in situations like Bollea v. Gawker
Media, LLC361 or the 2014 iCloud hack exposing nude images of female
celebrities,362 plaintiffs still have recourse in privacy law irrespective of
the means by which the information was originally accessed. In all of
these cases, downstream re-publishers could be similarly liable, so there
are substantial guardrails in place without having to condition a
defendant’s right to publish on the purity with which the information was
originally procured.
Decoupling procurement and publication would affect the public
concern element as well. The newsworthiness of information would
continue to be irrelevant to criminal or civil actions targeting illegal
procurement, and in publication-focused suits, defendants could still
protect themselves in most cases by demonstrating the newsworthiness of
the information.
But defendants would not have to demonstrate the newsworthiness of
information in order to avoid liability for crimes or torts relating to the
initial illegal procurement. There are many situations, especially in
hacking cases, where information is acquired that is not sensitive enough
to support a civil claim based on its publication but is also not plainly
358. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 529 (2001) (“The normal method of deterring unlawful
conduct is to impose an appropriate punishment on the person who engages in it,” and penalties for
violations can always “be made more severe.”).
359. See generally A Breakdown and Analysis of the December, 2014 Sony Hack, RISK BASED SEC.
(Dec. 5, 2014), https://www.riskbasedsecurity.com/2014/12/05/a-breakdown-and-analysis-of-thedecember-2014-sony-hack/ [https://perma.cc/LEL2-MPJM].
360. See generally Tim Wu, Don’t Prosecute Gizmodo for the iPhone that Walked into a Bar,
SLATE (Apr. 28, 2010, 4:04 PM), https://slate.com/technology/2010/04/don-t-prosecute-gizmodofor-the-lost-4g-iphone.html [https://perma.cc/CZ54-VPLC]. In that case, Gizmodo obtained an
unreleased iPhone that someone found at a bar and then provided to Gizmodo. Id. Apple pursued
criminal charges against Gizmodo but could plausibly have sued for violation of its trade secrets.
361. No. 522012CA012447, 2016 WL 4073660 (Fla. Cir. Ct. June 8, 2016).
362. See generally Charles Arthur, Naked Celebrity Hack: Security Experts Focus on iCloud
Backup Theory, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 1, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/sep
/01/naked-celebrity-hack-icloud-backup-jennifer-lawrence [https://perma.cc/2LN2-KQWX].
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newsworthy. Separating procurement and publication claims would put
the burden on the plaintiffs to demonstrate that published information has
caused some actionable harm instead of putting the burden on the
defendant to demonstrate the newsworthiness of the information. Under
Bartnicki, defendants like the Trump Campaign and WikiLeaks can be
held liable for publishing banal email correspondence, even without
evidence that it caused harm. Although Justice Stevens’s opinion did not
foreclose the possibility of Bartnicki protection for the publication of
information not addressing matters of public concern—he reserved that
question363—no lower court has extended Bartnicki that far, so this risk
remains. Indeed, in Cockrum, Judge Hudson did not refute the plaintiff’s
assertion that, as a matter of law, defendants claiming Bartnicki protection
must demonstrate that every disclosed fact relates to a matter of legitimate
public concern.364
It might be too much to expect the Court to abandon Bartnicki and
pursue this decoupling approach, particularly given the changes in the
makeup of the Court.365 But short of that, there are interpretive
modifications and clarifications the Supreme Court and lower courts
could make to the Bartnicki framework to help address the problems and
circuit splits that have emerged over the past twenty years.
B.

Aiding and Abetting as a New Prong One Standard

One of the most strongly rooted aspects of the Supreme Court’s First
Amendment jurisprudence is its rejection of the notion that journalists (or
those serving journalistic functions) should be offered special
dispensation from criminal sanctions or civil lawsuits targeting their
newsgathering behavior.366 Prong one of the Bartnicki test will therefore
endure, at least to the extent that it denies a legal shield to those who
violate the law by stealing or intercepting information and to those who
leak information that they were legally obligated to conceal. No courts
363. Stevens wrote that the Court did not need to decide whether the government’s interest in
deterring interceptions was strong enough to justify the application of the wiretap law to “disclosures
of . . . purely private concern,” because in Bartnicki the law’s enforcement implicated “the core
purposes of the First Amendment [by imposing] sanctions on the publication of truthful information
of public concern.” Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 533–34.
364. Cockrum v. Donald J. Trump for President, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 3d 652, 658 (E.D. Va. 2019).
365. Since Bartnicki was decided, Justices Souter, Stevens, Kennedy and Ginsburg have been
replaced by Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh and Barrett, respectively. Concurring Justice
O’Connor has been replaced by Justice Alito. Dissenting Justices Rehnquist and Scalia have been
replaced by Justices Roberts and Gorsuch, respectively. Concurring Justice Breyer, and dissenting
Justice Thomas, remain on the Court. See Justices 1789 to Present, SUP. CT. OF THE U.S.,
https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/members_text.aspx [https://perma.cc/P7HD-M5YS].
366. See supra text accompanying note 44.
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will provide sanctuary to those who are primary participants in the illegal
procurement of information, nor to their co-conspirators.367 The courts are
deeply divided, however, about the extent to which secondary participants
are eligible for Bartnicki protection. Justice Stevens did not offer much
detail, but Justice Breyer’s contingencies provided a script for judges to
impose any number of limitations.368
In demarcating this boundary, courts should be mindful of the strong
presumption in favor of free speech and press protection when weighed
against most other social interests, including personal privacy, as the
Court acknowledged.369 They should favor clear lines that minimize ad
hoc analyses by judges. And, not incidentally, they should recognize the
urgent need for robust journalistic and public scrutiny of powerful
institutions in light of the spread of authoritarianism, increasing
institutional opacity, withering free-press protections,370 and the fact that
new technologies, rather than serving as antidotes to concentrated power,
are increasingly exploited by corporations371 and governments372 to
enlarge their influence over consumers and citizens. With all of this in
mind, a reasonable approach would be to extend Bartnicki protection to
secondary participants except where they actively collaborate with
primary participants in a way that is akin to the crime of aiding and
abetting.373 Aiding and abetting charges typically apply to those who
actively and knowingly assist someone in the commission of a crime.374
Focusing on these criteria would mean that someone would not lose
Bartnicki protection merely because they knew the information was
367. See, e.g., Broidy Cap. Mgmt. LLC v. Muzin, No. 19-cv-0150 (DLF), 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
58302, at *63 (D.D.C. Mar. 31, 2020) (rejecting defendant’s First Amendment defense against a
computer hacking claim because he was not merely the publisher of the hacked information but was
also “‘alleged to have conspired with’ the hackers and to have taken part in a scheme to disseminate
the knowingly hacked information to the media”).
368. See supra text accompanying notes 95–96.
369. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 534 (2001) (noting that generally “privacy concerns give
way when balanced against the interest in publishing matters of public importance”).
370. See supra notes 17–19.
371. See generally SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM (1st ed. 2019).
372. See generally Andrea Kendall-Taylor, Erica Frantz & Joseph Wright, The Digital Dictators:
How
Technology
Strengthens
Autocracy,
FOREIGN
AFFS.
(Mar./Apr.
2020),
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2020-02-06/digital-dictators [https://perma.cc/88YZB83P].
373. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (authorizing criminal penalties for anyone who “aids, abets,
counsels, commands, induces or procures” the commission of a crime). Under the proposal suggested
in this Article, publication would not constitute abetting, and “counsels” would mean providing
material or technical assistance in the procurement of the information, not merely “encouraging,” the
leaking of information by the source.
374. Aiding and Abetting, JUSTIA, https://www.justia.com/criminal/offenses/inchoatecrimes/aiding-abetting/ [https://perma.cc/P7JH-WXPA].

Ugland & Mazzeo (Do Not Delete)

198

3/22/2021 11:58 AM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 96:139

illegally acquired by a source or where there was direct communication
between the source and publisher subsequent to the illegal acquisition by
the source. This would simplify matters and resolve the circuit split
between the Tenth Circuit (Quigley) and the Third Circuit (Jean) and fix
some of the uncertainty left by the D.C. Circuit’s Boehner rulings.
Applying this rule would offer protection to defendants like The New York
Times, which received some of Donald Trump’s tax returns likely with
full knowledge that they had been illegally leaked, and probably after
having communicated in some fashion with their source or sources.375
One caveat in this context is that it is crucial that courts not treat
information as property, at least where it involves matters of public
concern. Although aiding and abetting or illegal possession charges can
be brought against those who knowingly receive stolen personal property,
the same should not apply to information. There is no public interest
served by the illegal possession of stolen personal property.376 At the same
time, Bartnicki protection could reasonably be denied to someone who
knowingly received stolen information that they knew did not involve
matters of public concern and that they knew it was illegal to accept. So,
defendants who receive from sources things like stolen credit card
numbers or the passwords to protected computer systems could not invoke
Bartnicki merely because those exchanges involved information rather
than tangible property.377
Courts should also extend protection to those who request information
that has already been stolen by a source. This would support the ruling by
Judge Koeltl in DNC, in which he held WikiLeaks could not be held liable
for requesting information that it knew had been illegally hacked by
Russian operatives,378 and it would resolve the apparent split between
Judge Koeltl and Judge Hudson in the two DNC hacking cases.379 Courts
should take this one step further, however, to make clear that even
before-the-fact requests or pleas for information should be protected,
provided there is no inducement or coercion by the requester of the source,
nor any implicit quid pro quo. It is normal for reporters to ask for
information, and, as one court noted, “the First Amendment protects the
375. See supra text accompanying note 229.
376. This is why the analogy Judge Randolph used in Boehner II—that one can be criminally liable
for knowingly accepting a stolen ring—is inapt. Boehner II, 441 F.3d 1010, 1017 (D.C. Cir. 2006);
see also supra text accompanying note 164.
377. Of course, this would be different in cases where the defendant had a good faith belief that the
information being offered addressed matters of public concern, even if, after receiving the
information, this turned out not to be the case.
378. Democratic Nat’l Comm. (DNC) v. Russian Fed’n, 392 F. Supp. 3d. 410, 435–36
(S.D.N.Y. 2019).
379. Id.; Cockrum v. Donald J. Trump for President, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 3d 652 (E.D. Va. 2019).
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ordinary news gathering techniques of reporters and those techniques
cannot be stripped of their constitutional shield by calling them
tortious.”380 Of course, sources often break the law by leaking non-public
records. But to impute that liability to the requester of those records,
without any evidence of coercion or inducement, would violate the First
Amendment. This might represent an outer-limit interpretation of
Bartnicki, and no court has yet charted this boundary, but it would create
a clearer and more speech- and press-protective standard for linking
primary and secondary participants. In ordinary contexts not involving
news and information, people can be charged with the crime of solicitation
when they influence others to act unlawfully.381 But this typically applies
in felony cases where one “command[s], forc[es], or induc[es]” someone
to commit a crime.382 A simple request or plea for someone to access or
leak information in violation of the law should not be sufficient to attach
legal liability to the requester, at least where the information sought is
about a matter of public concern.383
When Donald Trump was campaigning against Hillary Clinton in 2016,
he publicly urged Russia to engage in computer crimes to locate the
thousands of emails Clinton deleted after leaving her job as Secretary of
State.384 “Russia, if you’re listening,” Trump said, “I hope you’re able to
find the 30,000 emails that are missing.”385 That same day, coincidentally
or not, Russian operatives made their first attempts to hack Clinton’s
servers.386 Whatever the ethical propriety of Trump’s plea, it should not
be treated as a solicitation of crime because he was too far removed from
the illegal actors, and the information he sought was of public concern.
The same should apply to someone like Nicholas Kristof of The New York
Times who urged IRS officials—via a tweet—to leak Trump’s tax records
to him.387 Even if Kristof’s tweet was a technical breach of the law, as

380. Nicholson v. McClatchy Newspapers, 223 Cal. Rptr. 58, 59–60 (Ct. App. 1986).
381. Solicitation, JUSTIA, https://www.justia.com/criminal/offenses/inchoate-crimes/solicitation/
[https://perma.cc/F7ZA-LLXA].
382. Id.
383. Courts might draw a distinction, for example, between soliciting someone to leak information
about clandestine government surveillance of U.S. citizens and soliciting someone to expose the
identities of undercover CIA agents.
384. Michael S. Schmidt, Trump Invited the Russians to Hack Clinton. Were They Listening?, N.Y.
TIMES (July 13, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/13/us/politics/trump-russia-clintonemails.html [https://perma.cc/RED5-7TL3].
385. Id.
386. Id.
387. See Kristof, supra note 20.
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some have suggested,388 it should be protected by the First Amendment.
Kristof was not in a position to influence IRS officials, he had no direct
contact with them, and the information he sought was plainly newsworthy.
Parts of the indictment of Julian Assange target a similarly general
exhortation—specifically WikiLeaks’s promulgation on its website of a
“Most Wanted Leaks” list.389 However scandalous one might find this
kind of communication, it is even less specific than Trump’s plea to the
Russians, and in neither case should Bartnicki protection be denied on the
basis of such indirect communication.
It is a closer call with regard to Assange’s interactions with Chelsea
Manning. Assange was in direct and ongoing communication with
Manning and made specific and repeated requests for information.
Nevertheless, those things alone should not be treated as sufficient to tie
the two together criminally or to negate Bartnicki protection. Manning
was not beholden to Assange or threatened by him, and Assange did not
offer any reward.390 Manning was always in control and had the
unencumbered discretion to act or not act. This is a crucial principle to
recognize because it arises daily in the context of leaks. Courts need to
assert once and for all that a reporter neither commits a crime nor loses
First Amendment protection by merely asking a source to leak classified
information—again, assuming it involves a matter of public concern. The
same should apply to those who encourage such disclosures, at least
where there is no coercion, inducement, or quid pro quo. Assange’s
prosecutors, perhaps inspired by Breyer’s concurrence,391 rest much of
their indictment on the fact that Assange encouraged Manning’s leaks,392
and some media lawyers have suggested that this might be enough to

388. Eugene Volokh, Is Asking IRS Agents to Leak President Trump’s Tax Return a Crime (and
Constitutionally Unprotected)?, WASH. POST (Mar. 6, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/new
s/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/03/06/is-asking-irs-agents-to-leak-president-trumps-tax-return-acrime-and-constitutionally-unprotected/?utm_term=.08375b889b82 [https://perma.cc/Q3KYMXCW].
389. Assange Superseding Indictment, supra note 6, at 5. The indictment alleges that Chelsea
Manning’s first disclosures of classified documents were in direct response to the WikiLeaks “Most
Wanted Hacks” appeal. Id. at 5–6.
390. This refers to a before-the-fact payment, which could serve to induce the illegal actions of the
source. After-the-fact payments, if they were never discussed prior to the exchange of information
between the publisher and the source, would not negate Bartnicki protection. See Allen v. Beirich,
No. CCB-18-3781, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 197183 (D. Md. Nov. 13, 2019).
391. Breyer implies in Bartnicki that a different result might be warranted in cases where a
defendant encouraged a source to illegally disclose information. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514,
538 (2001) (Breyer, J., concurring).
392. See supra text accompanying note 232.
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negate Assange’s possible First Amendment defense.393 But
encouragement is just a more emphatic species of “request” and creates
an amorphous threshold for criminal liability—one that is not suitable for
situations where substantial First Amendment interests are involved.
Where Assange potentially crossed the line, however, was in providing
particularized technical assistance to Manning. First Amendment
protection should not be denied to one who merely discusses with a source
the virtues of disclosing classified information. Nor should someone be
legally vulnerable for urging a source to illegally disclose information.
Courts might reasonably draw a distinction, however, between those
situations and ones in which the requester engaged in strategic
coordination394 with a source and shared expertise to facilitate the actual
execution of the illegal acts. So, much of what prosecutors emphasize in
the Assange indictment—Assange’s general calls for hacks and leaks,395
his encouragement of Manning,396 and his exchanges with Manning about
the most potentially fruitful databases to mine397—should not be treated
as consequential to Assange’s expected First Amendment defense. To the
extent that prosecutors can demonstrate that Assange aided and abetted
Manning by providing technical assistance, however, courts could treat
Assange as a primary participant, akin to the defendant in Peavy, whose
case Justice Stevens distinguished at the outset of his Bartnicki opinion.398
It is not clear, to be sure, that prosecutors will be able to prove that
Assange provided such assistance and that it was instrumental to
Manning’s illegal actions,399 but this is the only basis upon which the court
should consider denying Bartnicki protection to Assange under prong one.
In order to bring clarity to Bartnicki, lower courts should begin to
extend protection under prong one to all defendants who were not primary
393. See Floyd Abrams, What Facts Would Deny the Trump Campaign First Amendment
Protections in Colluding with Russia, JUST SEC. (Oct. 10, 2018), https://www.justsecurity.org/
60995/facts-deny-trump-campaign-amendment-protections-colluding-russia/
[https://perma.cc/JE2H-Y9TQ] (suggesting, in discussing the DNC hacking cases, that the Trump
Campaign would have “undercut” its First Amendment defense if it had “encouraged the Russians to
hack or steal materials” (emphasis added)).
394. This refers to coordination with regard to the illegal act itself, not things like plans for
publication or discussions about what types of information would be most useful or newsworthy.
395. Assange Superseding Indictment, supra note 6, at 20–22.
396. See supra text accompanying note 232.
397. Assange Superseding Indictment, supra note 6, at 6–7.
398. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 522 n.5 (2001).
399. The indictment alleges that Assange advised Manning about the use of a password hash that
would enable Manning to access databases without her identity being discovered. Assange
Superseding Indictment, supra note 6, at 7. It is not clear if Manning successfully used this technique,
but either way it could demonstrate an attempt by Assange to intervene as a participant in the
execution of the illegal act and undermine his expected reliance on Bartnicki.
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participants, either by virtue of their direct engagement in illegal activity
or their aiding or inducement of that activity. A defendant like the
National Enquirer, which acquired Jeff Bezos’s private emails to his
mistress, would not lose protection by paying to acquire information that
had already been illegally acquired, but it would lose protection if it paid
the source to acquire the information in the first place. The latter would
essentially make the source an agent of the Enquirer and make the
Enquirer effectively a primary participant in the interception.
Courts should reject Breyer’s suggestion that Bartnicki protection
might
be
denied
to
those
who
“encouraged,”
or
400
“participated . . . indirectly” in an illegal interception or to those who,
after the fact, helped transport the information from one node to
another.401 Courts should accept Breyer’s suggestion, however, that
protection be denied to those who “ordered”402 illegal activity, but only
where the requester had some actual power over the source. Similarly,
courts could embrace Breyer’s suggestion that requesters who
“counseled”403 their source might lose First Amendment protection,
provided the counseling involved strategic or technical assistance that
enabled the illegal act itself.
C.

Narrow Prong Two: No Liability for Possessing Newsworthy
Information

The second part of the Bartnicki test—that the defendant acquired the
information lawfully—was very likely added by Justice Stevens to simply
acknowledge a question the Court raised but did not answer in Florida
Star. In that case, the Court held that the First Amendment protected a
reporter’s publication of non-public information that had been
accidentally supplied by a government employee.404 The Court declined
to decide whether the outcome would be different in situations in which
the law specifically prohibited receipt or possession of the information.405
In Bartnicki, Justice Stevens noted that Yocum and Vopper had acquired

400. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 538 (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting Petition for Writ of Certiori at
33a, Bartnicki, 532 U.S. 514 (No. 99–1687)).
401. This was a particularly odd condition for Breyer to mention because transporting an illegally
intercepted communication is exactly what Yocum did, yet the Court was clear that Yocum’s actions
were protected. See id. at 525 n.8 (majority opinion) (“[W]e draw no distinction between the media
respondents and Yocum.”).
402. Id. at 538 (Breyer, J., concurring).
403. Id.
404. Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 524 (1989).
405. Id. at 535 n.8.
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the tape of the intercepted phone conversation lawfully,406 so there was
once again no reason for the Court to answer the question it reserved in
Florida Star. Justice Stevens was not necessarily limiting First
Amendment protection to situations in which defendants’ obtainment or
possession of information was lawful; he was recognizing that the
lawfulness of the acquisition by Yocum and Vopper was not in dispute.
Lower courts have not focused on the impetus for prong two, in part
because it has not been consequential to the outcome of most cases. For
those courts that have applied prong two directly, some, like the D.C.
Circuit in Boehner II, have conflated it with prong one.407 Others, like the
Seventh Circuit in Dahlstrom, have treated the unlawfulness of receiving
or possessing information as automatically and fully destructive of
Bartnicki protection, even when the government supplies the information
and it relates to a matter of public concern.408 This is a punishingly strict
interpretation that treats surface illegality as decisive, even when it
implicates First Amendment interests.409 It also creates a loophole for
legislators to exploit, allowing them to treat newsworthy information as
contraband and disrupting the balance of interests the Court sought to
achieve in Bartnicki. In addition, it creates the further danger of punishing
or chilling ordinary newsgathering functions by forcing requesters of
information to assume the risk that the information they seek might turn
out to fall within the parameters of a statutory prohibition and subject
them to civil or criminal penalties.
One viable response to all of this would be for courts to simply ignore
prong two, which, for reasons noted above, they are arguably free to do.410
A more affirmative and speech-protective approach would be to subject
to strict scrutiny any government measure authorizing penalties for the
possession or receipt of newsworthy information. Information should not
be treated like tangible property, except in very unusual situations,411 and
never when it involves matters of legitimate public concern. Absent a
compelling government interest, laws like the Espionage Act and the
Driver’s Privacy Protection Act should be struck down to the extent that

406. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 525.
407. Boehner II, 441 F.3d 1010, 1017 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (treating the knowing receipt of illegally
acquired information as indistinguishable from direct participation in the illegal acquisition).
408. Dahlstrom v. Sun-Times Media, LLC, 777 F.3d 937, 952 (7th Cir. 2015).
409. Indeed, in Bartnicki, the Court noted that both Vopper and Yocum violated the law by
disclosing illegally acquired communications, but the Court concluded that it must then consider
“whether the application of [the wiretap] statutes in such circumstances violates the First
Amendment.” Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 525.
410. See supra text accompanying notes 404–406; see also supra note 253.
411. See Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 517–18.
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they are designed to, or have the effect of, halting the flow of newsworthy
information. If laws either explicitly or effectively prohibit the receipt or
possession of newsworthy information by non-custodians, those
provisions should be strictly scrutinized and, in most cases, struck down.
The cases of Guardian reporter Glenn Greenwald, who has been
charged with violating criminal laws in Brazil after accepting hacked
information, and Julian Assange, who is being prosecuted under the
Espionage Act, should not hinge on the literal language of criminal
statutes without regard to the First Amendment interests at stake.
Applying prong two of Bartnicki too broadly creates an untenable
situation in which a legislative act can be used to thwart a criminal
defendant’s ability to even invoke the Bartnicki protection. This puts free
speech interests in jeopardy and puts statutory law ahead of
constitutional law.
There really is only one scenario in which prong two, or something like
it, might be reasonable: where someone seeks information knowing that
the receipt or possession of that information is prohibited by law and
knowing that the information is not of public concern. But courts should
still distinguish the act of obtainment from the act of publication and apply
the First Amendment to each independently. There are constitutionally
permissible ways in which governments can penalize illegal procurement,
unlawful obtainment, or injurious publication. The principal mistake the
Supreme Court and many lower courts have made is linking the three
instead of treating them as discrete acts requiring discrete
constitutional analyses.
D.

Affirming the Contextual View of Public Concern Under
Prong Three

In Bartnicki, Justice Stevens and Justice Breyer appeared to present two
different approaches to assessing the extent to which information
addresses matters of public concern. Stevens focused on the broader
context or social debate to which the information related, while Breyer
emphasized the more acute threat posed by Kane’s “porches” comment.
These are not irreconcilable. One could embrace a contextual approach
but also acknowledge that a particular fact makes the newsworthiness of
the publication especially obvious. Justice Breyer could simply have been
saying that he did not need to examine the broader context of the
Kane-Bartnicki phone call because the porches comment, by itself, was
sufficient. Nevertheless, some lower courts have seized on the porches
comment and Breyer’s concurrence to suggest that anything short of a
threat of violence will not satisfy prong three. Courts like the Seventh
Circuit in Dahlstrom, and more recently Judge Hudson’s opinion in
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Cockrum, treat the porches comment as a minimum threshold, which is
almost certainly not what Breyer intended. In any case, that interpretation
makes it far too easy for judges to distinguish Bartnicki and effectively
limit its protection to extreme cases. Lower courts should reject that
narrow view (as most have, effectively if not explicitly), which departs
from the approach courts have traditionally applied in other cases.
A related issue that courts must resolve is how to assess the
newsworthiness of publications involving troves of data where the
material generally addresses matters of public concern but where not
every component piece of information, in isolation, meets that standard—
or where small bits of private information are embedded in the larger
collection of newsworthy materials. The competing opinions of Judge
Koeltl and Judge Hudson in the two DNC hacking cases showcase this
dilemma, with Judge Hudson suggesting that defendants must
demonstrate the newsworthiness of all of the revealed parts412 and Judge
Koeltl holding that prong three should be analyzed by assessing the
newsworthiness of the whole.413
Courts should embrace Judge Koeltl’s view for two related reasons.
The first is that the purpose of the Bartnicki test is not to determine
whether defendants should be fully immune from liability for harms
flowing from their publications; it is to determine whether there is a basis
for linking the defendants to the illegal actions of those who unlawfully
procured the information. Because the defendant publishers are at least a
step removed from the first-link actors, and because the purpose of prong
three is not to balance the various interests but simply to determine if there
is at least some public value served by publication, it makes sense for
courts to apply an expansive concept of public interest in that context.
A second reason for embracing a broad definition of public concern is
that there are almost always post-publication remedies available to
plaintiffs if the published information causes some demonstrable harm. In
hacking cases like those involving the DNC, Bartnicki would lose all of
its force if defendants were required to demonstrate the newsworthiness
of every published fragment of information. At the same time, there are
real risks that private information will sometimes be swept up and
exposed as part of large-scale disclosures. The best accommodation is to
take a broad view of public concern under prong three but recognize that
publishers receive no special protection from post-publication lawsuits
targeting the content of their disclosures. Publishers would therefore still
have an incentive to search for and filter out private information, but the

412. See supra text accompanying note 349.
413. See supra text accompanying note 350.
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burden of proof would remain with the plaintiffs to demonstrate, in
separate a lawsuit, the specific ways in which the published information
has caused them harm.
There are a couple of additional issues under prong three that warrant
some attention but that are less critical. One is the lingering confusion
about terminology. Chief Justice Rehnquist was not entirely wrong to
point out in his dissent that “public concern” is “an amorphous
concept.”414 But the Court added some clarity in two post-Bartnicki
rulings—Roe and Snyder415—and for decades the Supreme Court and
lower courts have applied parallel concepts like public issue, public
interest, and newsworthiness, so the Bartnicki Court’s use of public
concern was appropriate for the kind of macro-level test it was
articulating. Still, it would be ideal if the Court simply declared that the
variations among these terms are not legally consequential in this context.
Finally, there is the issue of the journalistic standing of defendants and
whether their credentials, institutional affiliations, or the media through
which they communicate are relevant in assessing either their general
eligibility for Bartnicki protection or their more specific ability to
demonstrate the newsworthiness of their disclosures. The indictment of
Julian Assange seems carefully framed to downplay the journalistic
legitimacy of Wikileaks and to present Assange as a simple vandal. The
indictment does not mention the First Amendment, much less Bartnicki.
But any attempt to deny Assange’s ability to invoke Bartnicki finds no
support from the Bartnicki justices, who made clear that they drew “no
distinction between the media respondents and Yocum.”416 There is also
remarkably little support for this view in the two decades of decisions
applying Bartnicki. Aside from one state district court that made the
anomalous and conceptually indefensible417 claim that defendants might
have less Bartnicki protection when they publish via commercial media,418
the other courts have been remarkably consistent in focusing solely on the
social value of the information published rather than the characteristics or
motives of the publisher. This is one area where the courts have moved
toward a more contemporary and egalitarian conception of press freedom.

414. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 542 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
415. See supra text accompanying notes 300–303.
416. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 525 n.8.
417. Excluding protection for defendants who profit from their publications would necessarily
exclude most news organizations, most of which distribute content through purchased media products
that are sustained through advertising and subscription fees.
418. See Bowens v. Ary, Inc., No. 282711, 2009 Mich. App. LEXIS 2000, at *21 (Sept. 24, 2009),
rev’d in part, 489 Mich. 851 (Mich. 2011).
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CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence has always
emphasized the free flow of information from “diverse and
antagonistic”419 sources of information and the need for “uninhibited,
robust, and wide open”420 debate on public issues. Those objectives can
be powerfully served by modern communication technology and citizen
communicators, but only if those people and tools are not unduly
constrained by law. Bartnicki was an important decision, rendered at the
dawn of the Internet age, that extended the principles of Pentagon Papers
outside of the prior restraint circumstance and affirmed the constitutional
bias in favor of the largely unfettered circulation of newsworthy
information—whatever its provenance—by law-abiding communicators.
Bartnicki’s effect on contemporary communication, however, is less
clear. Lower courts applying the decision have reached disparate
conclusions and collectively have done more to obfuscate than illuminate
the parameters of the Bartnicki framework. Many of those courts have
also sapped Bartnicki of its force by narrowly reading Stevens’s opinion
or giving almost superseding weight to Breyer’s concurrence.
This ambiguity is enormously consequential in light of the ways in
which communication is now accessed and shared, and in light of the new
wave of cases arriving in U.S. courts. When and if Assange is prosecuted,
his case will occur in a legal domain that, two decades after Bartnicki and
a half-century after Pentagon Papers, still has few clear lines of
demarcation. This uncertainty was exposed and exacerbated by some of
the first post-Bartnicki circuit rulings,421 and it is apparent in the most
recent district court cases as well.422
Bartnicki was a necessary decision but a needlessly complicated one.
The Court could have leaned on earlier precedent—both its own decisions
in cases like Daily Mail and influential circuit decisions like Food Lion—
to recognize the separateness of procurement and publication and to treat
them as discrete acts subject to discrete remedies and constitutional
analyses. That remains the best path forward: untethering people’s First
Amendment right to publish from their actions, and the actions of their
sources, in acquiring information. Short of that, there is substantial work
ahead for the courts in clarifying the elements of the Bartnicki framework.
419. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
420. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
421. Compare Quigley v. Rosenthal, 327 F.3d 1044 (10th Cir. 2003), with Jean v. Mass. State
Police, 492 F.3d 24 (1st Cir. 2007).
422. Compare Cockrum v. Donald J. Trump for President, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 3d 652 (E.D. Va.
2019), with Democratic Nat’l Comm. (DNC) v. Russian Fed’n, 392 F. Supp. 3d 410 (S.D.N.Y. 2019).
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With regard to prong one, courts should only deny Bartnicki protection
to those who were primary participants in illegally procuring information,
those who aided and abetted a primary participant by providing significant
before-the-fact assistance, or those who intentionally sought out private
information that they knew was illegal to disclose and was not of public
concern. Courts should effectively eliminate prong two by rejecting the
treatment of information as property and closing the loophole exposed by
the Seventh Circuit in Dahlstrom that authorizes liability for the mere
receipt or possession of newsworthy information. This could be used as a
back door to criminalize leaks—for both government-leakers and
journalist-leakees.423 Finally, with regard to prong three, courts should
embrace Justice Stevens’s contextual view of public concern and, with
large batches of information, focus on the newsworthiness of the whole
while still preserving remedies for plaintiffs who are individually harmed
by the publication of their private information.
These and other changes described in this Article will help bring clarity
to the law while strengthening the rights of journalists and citizens to
circulate information about public issues and hold accountable
government and other powerful interests. This would also serve as a small
but useful step in halting the broader drift toward authoritarian
government, institutional opacity, and concentrated private-sector power.

423. Relatedly, courts should reject the Seventh Circuit’s treatment of records requesters as primary
participants when information is supplied to them by government agencies and other third parties. See
supra section III.B.

